United Nations S/2014/236

Security Council

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Australia, France, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions and presidential statements concerning the situation in Sudan and underlining the importance of full compliance with these,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Sudan and its determination to work with the Government of Sudan, in full respect of its sovereignty, to assist in tackling the various challenges in Sudan,

Recalling the importance of the principles of the peaceful settlement of international disputes, good neighbourliness, non-interference and cooperation in the relations among States in the region,

Recalling its resolution 2086 (2013) and reaffirming the basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, and *recognizing* that the mandate of each peacekeeping mission is specific to the need and situation of the country concerned,

Commending the efforts of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) towards promoting peace and stability in Darfur, and *reiterating* its full support for UNAMID,

Expressing deep concern at the considerable deterioration of the security situation in Darfur during 2013, with continued clashes between the Government of Sudan and rebel armed groups and an intensification of inter-communal violence, including with the involvement of elements of paramilitary units and tribal militias, which has become the main source of violence against civilians and of population displacement,

Expressing concern at the prevalence of arms in Darfur and the continued threats to civilians posed by unexploded ordnance,

Expressing deep concern at the impact of deteriorating security on the civilian population, including the significant increase in population displacements in 2013, and the consequent increase in humanitarian and protection needs, including related to sexual and gender-based violence and violence against children; *noting* that humanitarian actors were able to reach the majority of people in need of

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humanitarian assistance in Darfur in 2013, with the notable exception of those vulnerable populations in areas of active fighting, including the East Jebel Marra region; in this regard, *expressing particular concern* at reports of an escalation of violence in Darfur since February 2014, resulting in the displacement of a large number of civilians, and at the denial of access for UNAMID and humanitarian actors to the affected areas by the Sudanese authorities; and further *expressing concern* over the insufficient availability of funding for humanitarian actors,

Reiterating its strong condemnation of attacks against UNAMID, and its call on the Government of Sudan swiftly to investigate these attacks and to bring the perpetrators to justice, and on all parties in Darfur to cooperate fully with the Mission,

Reiterating that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Darfur, and that an inclusive political settlement is essential to re-establishing peace, and *underscoring* the importance of fully addressing the root causes of the conflict in the search for a sustainable peace, which should rapidly deliver real benefits for the Darfuri people, in this regard *reiterating* its support for the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) as a solid basis for the Darfur peace process, and for its accelerated implementation,

Noting in this regard that UNAMID's ability to facilitate progress in implementation of the DDPD is hampered by delays by the signatory parties and the absence of an inclusive political settlement between the government and non-signatory movements, *expressing concern* that the humanitarian and security situation, as well as lack of capacity of the Darfur Regional Authority, hinder the transition from relief to stabilization and development activities, *urging* donors to honour their pledges and fulfil their obligations in a timely manner, including those commitments made at the conference in Doha in April 2013, and *affirming* that development can support a lasting peace in Darfur,

Commending the efforts of Joint Special Representative Mohamed ibn Chambas to revitalize the peace process, including through renewed engagement of the non-signatory movements, and *urging* all parties to the conflict to cease all acts of violence immediately, and to engage in the peace process without preconditions on the basis of the DDPD, in order to bring a durable and stable peace to the region,

Encouraging the Joint Special Representative to continue his efforts to increase the inclusiveness of the political process, guided by the Framework for AU and United Nations Facilitation of the Darfur Peace Process, and to coordinate with the African Union-High Level Implementation Panel (AU-HIP) and the United Nations Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan to synchronize their mediation efforts while taking into account ongoing transformation at the national level, *welcoming* in this regard the announcement by President Bashir on 27 January of a national dialogue, *noting* that the modalities of such a dialogue should provide an opportunity to address the legitimate grievances of the people of Darfur, *looking forward* to further developments towards the implementation of an inclusive dialogue process, and stressing the importance of the effective participation of women in this process, and in efforts towards peace in Darfur,

Noting that local dispute resolution mechanisms play an important role in preventing and resolving inter-communal conflict, including conflict over natural resources, and *urging* an intensification of effective efforts to prevent local disputes

leading to violence, with its corresponding impact on the local civilian populations, *acknowledging* the efforts of Sudanese authorities and local mediators to mediate in inter-tribal fighting, with support from UNAMID and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), and *urging* their continued work,

Welcoming that, over the last year, cooperation between UNAMID and the Government of Sudan has resulted in improvements in mandate implementation, including through the more timely issuance of visas, but *expressing deep concern* that continued access restrictions and delays in the issuance of customs clearances for contingent-owned equipment significantly undermine UNAMID's effectiveness, and further *expressing deep concern* that the delivery of humanitarian assistance is constrained and delayed by particular restrictions facing humanitarian actors, and that insufficient cooperation by the Government, particularly in terms of access, seriously constrains the Mission's ability to operate,

Expressing deep concern that shortfalls in the operational capabilities of some military and police components seriously constrain the force's mobility, effectiveness and ability to deter and respond robustly to attacks,

Noting the need for effective coordination and integration structures within UNAMID, and between UNAMID and UNCT, and *encouraging* swift development and implementation of a clearer strategic vision, priorities and a strategic and operational planning system within UNAMID, as well as an improved early warning and response mechanism and coordination of protection of civilians activities with UNCT,

Recalling the AU Peace and Security Council Communiqué of 24 March 2014,

1. *Welcomes and endorses* the Secretary-General's Special Report of 25 February 2014 (S/2014/138) on the review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and its recommendations, pursuant to Security Council resolution 2113 (2013);

2. *Takes note* of the proposed adjustment of the benchmarks and indicators for UNAMID outlined in the Secretary-General's report S/2014/138, and requests the Secretary-General to further refine these benchmarks and indicators to reflect the revised strategic priorities of the Mission, and submit them in his next 90-day report;

3. *Stresses* the important role of the AU in supporting implementation of the review of UNAMID; and *welcomes* the continued efforts of the Joint Support Coordination Mechanism, including in performing important coordination, support and liaison functions;

4. *Endorses* UNAMID's revised strategic priorities of: the protection of civilians, the facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel; mediation between the Government of Sudan and non-signatory armed movements on the basis of the DDPD, while taking into account ongoing democratic transformation at the national level; and support to the mediation of community conflict, including through measures to address its root causes, in conjunction with UNCT;

5. *Requests* UNAMID to focus and streamline its activities, across its military, police and civilian components in order to achieve progress on these three strategic priorities, *recognizes* that their effective implementation will require

certain Mission tasks to be deprioritized and *requests* the Secretary-General to include these tasks in his next regular report on UNAMID;

6. *Takes note* of the Secretary-General's intention to reduce UNAMID's police component swiftly, in order to increase the effectiveness of that component, *requests* the Secretary-General to provide detailed and updated information on the implementation of this reduction in his next report, and *stresses* in this regard the importance of effective deployment, training and operational capability of UNAMID's police component;

7. *Notes* that UNAMID faces three major challenges in the effective discharge of its mandate, in the light of the evolving political and security environment, namely: the cooperation and partnership of the Government of Sudan in mandate implementation; major shortfalls in several troop- and police-contingent operational capabilities; and the need for improved coordination and integration structures within UNAMID and between UNAMID and UNCT;

8. *Requests* that UNAMID identify, in the context of these challenges, steps by which it will achieve its revised strategic priorities more effectively, and further requests the Secretary-General to report on these steps in his regular reports to the Council on UNAMID;

9. *Welcomes* the planned efforts on the part of the United Nations and the relevant troop- and police-contributing countries to address shortfalls in the operational capabilities of some contingents, including enhanced engagement by the African Union and United Nations Secretariat with these countries, and *encourages* UNAMID to move to a more preventive and pre-emptive posture in pursuit of its priorities and in active defence of its mandate, building on positive steps taken so far, without prejudice to the agreed basic principles of peacekeeping;

10. *Stresses* the need to address gaps in the integrated strategic and operational architecture of UNAMID, *calls on* UNAMID and UNCT to put in place the full requirements of the United Nations Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning, including the establishment of integrated mechanisms for joint analysis, planning, coordination, monitoring, and decision-making, especially for joint operational planning for the military and police on protection of civilians; *further calls on* the Secretariat to assist the Mission in these tasks, and *requests* that the Secretary-General include steps taken in this regard in his next regular report to the Council on UNAMID;

11. *Notes with concern* the strategic gap in mobility for the mission, and the continuing critical need for aviation capacity and other mobility assets, including military utility helicopters for UNAMID, *calls on* Member States to redouble their efforts to provide aviation units to the mission, and on the Government of Sudan to facilitate the deployment of those assets already pledged, and *requests* the Secretary-General to include information on related force generation efforts in his regular reports, and on what other strategies can offset this critical military gap;

12. *Urges* all relevant actors to implement the review of UNAMID swiftly and fully, requests the Secretary-General to include in his next regular report to the Council on UNAMID specific information and operational recommendations as required on the cost efficiency and reduction of the Mission's military, police and civilian components to maximize Mission effectiveness in the implementation of its

revised strategic priorities, and *expresses its intention* to make necessary adjustments accordingly;

13. *Calls on* all parties in Darfur to remove all obstacles to UNAMID's full and proper discharge of its mandate, and *calls on* the Government of Sudan to comply with the Status of Forces Agreement fully and without delay, and to enhance its cooperation with UNAMID on the implementation of UNAMID's mandate;

14. *Stresses* the importance of effective monitoring and evaluation of UNAMID's impact in order to improve its effectiveness and *looks forward* to considering progress in implementation of the review on the basis of the Secretary-General's regular reports to the Council;

15. *Looks forward* to assessing the initial impact of implementation of the review before renewing UNAMID's mandate in August 2014, and *expresses its intention* to ensure that UNAMID's mandate reflects the revised strategic priorities set out in the Secretary-General's Special Report;

16. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

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Security Council

Distr.: General
31 March 2014

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Letter dated 31 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of the documents issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 30 March 2014, as follows:

- The statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with regard to the Security Council's denouncement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's self-defensive rocket launch exercises (see annex I).
- The answer given by the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to a question raised by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) with regard to the adoption of the "resolution" against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by the Human Rights Council (see annex II).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ja** Song Nam
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex I to the letter dated 31 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea blasts Security Council for taking issue with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea over its justifiable rocket launching drills

Pyongyang, 30 March (KCNA) — The Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued the following statement blasting the Security Council for its illegal action of taking issue with the justifiable rocket launching drills conducted by the Korean People's Army:

The sincere efforts of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to prevent a new war and ensure peace and security on the Korean peninsula are facing a grave challenge of the hostile forces.

The Security Council, at a closed-door consultative meeting held on 28 March at the urgent request of the United States of America, committed an illegal provocative act of "denouncing" the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's justifiable rocket launching drills for no reason.

The drills were self-defensive military drills of the Korean People's Army to cope with the grave situation created by the United States hostile policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which has been pursued for the past several decades and the evermore intensified exercises for a nuclear war.

The climate for détente is being created on the Korean peninsula thanks to the proactive and peace-loving sincere efforts of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea this year. Nevertheless, the United States kicked off the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle joint military exercises with south Korean puppet forces with huge aggression forces and destructive weapons involved.

With their scale and danger increased, the largest-ever forces since 1993 are involved in the Ssangyong drill, which started on 27 March. The United States dared declare that its main objective is to "occupy Pyongyang".

It is quite natural for the Korean People's Army to make full preparations to cope with the prevailing grave situation, as its mission is to protect the security of the country and its people and defend peace.

However, the Security Council, shutting its eyes to the United States madcap nuclear war exercises, "denounced" the Korean People's Army self-defensive rocket launching drills to cope with them as a "violation of resolutions" and "threat to international peace and security" and is set to take an "appropriate step". It is absolutely intolerable.

As far as the Security Council "resolutions", which it claimed were "violated" by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, are concerned, they are full of brigandish paragraphs to wantonly encroach on the sovereignty of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the security of the nation and deprive it of its right to launch satellites for peaceful purposes, as they are a product of the United States hostile policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, therefore, categorically rejected them as soon as they were adopted and there is no ground whatsoever for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to be bound to them.

If something is measured by a wrong ruler, a wrong result is bound to be produced.

That is why there is such absurdity that the efforts of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to defend the security of the country and the nation are labelled a "provocation" and the United States moves for igniting a nuclear war are described as ones for "defending peace".

If the Security Council persistently tries to deny the exercise of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's just right by partially citing the unreasonable "resolutions" according to the United States scenario, it will end up escalating tensions and sparking conflict only, far from contributing to keeping peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the region.

The farce staged by the United States to "denounce" the Democratic People's Republic of Korea rocket launching drills for no reason after bringing them up for discussion at the Security Council is aimed to divert the blame for escalating tensions to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and hype the Democratic People's Republic of Korea "threat" to have a justification for arms build-up pursuant to its pivot to Asia-Pacific strategy.

As the United States persists in its moves to isolate and stifle the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by abusing the Security Council, prompted by its strategic interests, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has the right to defend itself and is fully ready to do so.

Now that the United States is staging ceaseless nuclear war exercises by mobilizing all types of nuclear strike means aimed at "occupying Pyongyang", while describing the exercises as "annual ones", the Korean People's Army drills to cope with them will involve various forms of exercises in which more diversified nuclear deterrence will be used for hitting various medium- and long-range targets with a variety of striking power.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is fully ready for next-stage steps, which the enemy can hardly imagine, in case the United States considers them as a "provocation" again.

It would not rule out a new form of nuclear test for bolstering up its nuclear deterrence.

The United States had better ponder over this and stop acting rashly.

If a catastrophic development which no one wants occurs on the peninsula, the United States will be wholly responsible for it.

Annex II to the letter dated 31 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

"Resolution on human rights" against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea rejected: Foreign Ministry spokesman

Pyongyang, 31 March (KCNA) — The spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea gave the following answer, on 30 March, to a question put by the Korean Central News Agency as regards the adoption of the "resolution" against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by the Human Rights Council:

The twenty-fifth meeting of the Human Rights Council released a "report" of the "Commission of Inquiry" on the human rights situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and railroaded a "resolution" against it.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has not recognized the Commission of Inquiry grouping political swindlers, marionettes of the United States and the West, and totally opposes and rejects the above-mentioned resolution, a product of the vicious hostile policy towards it.

Unable to bring down the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by taking issue with it over its nuclear issue only, the United States and other hostile forces are making false facts in succession in a bid to intensify "human rights racket" against it to invent an excuse for interfering in its internal affairs and topple down its social system.

The United States and Japan, war criminal states and unethical criminal states with the history of aggression, plunder and murder against other countries and nations in the past, and the European Union are concealing their past history stained with blood, styling themselves "human rights judges" and resorting to political slander and attacks on independent countries, steeped in inveterate repugnance towards them.

If human rights are to be discussed sincerely, it is necessary to bring for discussion at the International Criminal Court and punish, first of all, the United States aggression of sovereign states, including Iraq and Afghanistan, genocide, Japan's past heinous crimes against humanity and misanthropy, racial discrimination, chauvinism and new Nazism rampant in European Union countries.

Human rights precisely mean national sovereignty.

If politicization of human rights, selectivity and double standards pursued by the United States, which has no qualification to say about genuine human rights, and forces following it are connived at, acts of calling into question specific countries, prompted by political motive, will be more rampant day by day.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea will firmly defend the idea and socialist system chosen by itself and continue sincerely discharging its duty in the field of international human rights.

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Security Council

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1 April 2014

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Letter dated 1 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that, under the Presidency of Nigeria, the Security Council is scheduled to hold an open debate on "security sector reform: challenges and opportunities". The debate will be held on Monday, 28 April 2014, under the agenda item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security". In order to help steer the discussion on the subject, Nigeria has prepared the attached concept note (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and the annex thereto were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) U. Joy **Ogwu**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* Reissued for technical reasons on 14 April 2014.

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Annex to the letter dated 1 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Nigeria's Presidency of the Security Council

"Security sector reform: challenges and opportunities"

Concept note on Security Council action

Security sector reform is increasingly recognized by Member States as an important vehicle for supporting the security and safety of the State and its people. The United Nations has made significant strides in strengthening the coherence and effectiveness of its support to security sector reform. Security sector reform has moved from being a little-known concept within the United Nations to becoming a core component of the Organization's engagement across peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development contexts. Key achievements include the development of technical guidance to improve the delivery of support; the establishment of specialized capacities for security sector reform in the field and at United Nations Headquarters; the enhancing of system-wide coherence and coordination, including through the collaborative efforts of the task force, whose membership has doubled from 7 to 14 in five years; and the forging of partnerships with both regional and subregional organizations, Member States, and civil society.

The second report of the Secretary-General on security sector reform (A/67/970-S/2013/480), released in August 2013, recognizes the need to both learn from and build on these achievements. At the same time, while much progress has been made, the protracted conflicts, emerging threats and complex crises witnessed in the world today require innovative and flexible responses from the United Nations. There is a need to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in supporting security sector reform, as a key tool in the prevention and management of conflict. In this regard, the role of the Security Council is crucial in providing strategic guidance and in defining the institutional priorities of the United Nations.

Against this background, the Federal Republic of Nigeria, during its Presidency of the Security Council, in April 2014, will convene a high-level meeting on the issue of security sector reform. The objective will be to adopt a Security Council resolution that would signal the Council's commitment to further strengthen the important role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform. The meeting will build on the presidential statement that Nigeria sponsored in 2011, which called for an assessment of the United Nations approach to security sector reform, resulting in the second report of the Secretary-General on this topic. It will also seek to operationalize the recommendations contained in that report and, in particular, will identify challenges in their implementation in order to advance a series of practical steps designed to strengthen United Nations support to national and regional security sector reform processes. Council members are invited to participate at the Ministerial level. The Secretary-General and other high-level representatives of the United Nations system will be invited to provide briefings, along with a small number of other high-level invitees.

The present concept paper elaborates on a number of important questions related to the initiative:

- Why is security sector reform important?
- Why is security sector reform important to the Council?
- What is the added value of a Council resolution at this time?
- What are the issues that should be discussed in a debate in the Council in view of achieving an action-oriented resolution on security sector reform?

Why is security sector reform important?

Security is the bedrock upon which States are built. The security sector, comprising, among other things, defence, law enforcement, corrections, customs and oversight bodies, enables the State to extend public security and the rule of law within its territorial boundaries. From a prevention perspective, the absence of adequate management and oversight mechanisms often leads to predation, in which security institutions become a law unto themselves, threatening the very population they are entrusted to protect. The organized efforts of a desperate population often means resorting to arms in defence against predatory security institutions, leading to armed conflict within the country. In post-conflict contexts, security institutions are often weak and dysfunctional, ineffective in their impact and illegitimate in their foundation. Failure to address such operational and accountability deficits have often undermined the positive gains of peacekeeping and necessitated the return of peacekeeping missions to previous areas of operation. Security sector reform is therefore an avenue through which States are able to ensure that the security sector is accountable, effective and responsive to the needs of the population.[1] This is essential for ensuring the security of the State and its people (see A/67/970-S/2013/480).

A major and defining lesson of United Nations experience is that security sector reform goes beyond activities seeking to professionalize individual security pillars, such as the police, corrections, immigration, defence and civil emergency functions. In order for the process to be transformative and its impact sustainable, security sector reform extends to the security architecture as a whole. These sector-wide elements, which underpin the legitimacy and integrity of security institutions, include defining the strategic policy framework upon which security institutions are built, strengthening parliamentary oversight and engaging in dialogue to ensure a common national vision for the security sector. The purpose is to enhance the quality of security sector governance through a focus on accountability, inclusivity and effective management and oversight. The United Nations is increasingly providing assistance in this area, and in his second report on security sector reform (A/67/970-S/2013/480), the Secretary-General notes that the Organization "is particularly well positioned to support such reforms" and "may have a comparative advantage relative to other partners in providing sector-wide support".

[1] Security sector reform is defined as a process of "assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law" (A/62/659-S/2008/39, para. 17).

While security sector reform was initially introduced in the United Nations in the context of identifying peacekeeping exit strategies, this has evolved significantly. In his report, the Secretary-General recognizes that security sector reform is pertinent across the United Nations "peacekeeping, human rights, peacebuilding, conflict prevention and development agendas". For instance, security sector reform plays a key role in supporting peacebuilding by enabling the development of resilient and legitimate security institutions that are able to respond effectively to sources of insecurity.[2] Security sector reform has been a key peacebuilding priority for the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund in such countries as Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Burundi and the Central African Republic.[3] Security sector reform is also widely acknowledged to be an important element of conflict prevention. Ensuring effective governance and oversight of the security sector to mitigate its instrumentalization is a key conflict prevention mechanism (see S/PRST/2010/14).

Why is security sector reform important to the Council?

The Security Council has recognized in numerous presidential statements that security sector reform is a fundamental component of any approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and that it is critical to preventing countries from relapsing into conflict. Security sector reform is also of significant operational importance to the Council, as described below:

- Security sector reform is a key component of Security Council mission mandates. Illustratively, in 2013, 47 resolutions were adopted by the Council, of which 24 made explicit reference to security sector reform.[4] In 2008, there were a total of 14 references to security sector reform in Security Council resolutions; in 2012, the number had risen to 37 (see A/67/970-S/2013/480).
- Security sector reform is crucial to a large number of Security Council contexts. The references to security sector reform are found in the mandates of both peacekeeping and special political missions. Currently, six peacekeeping missions and eight special political missions and regional offices are mandated to provide security sector reform support to host Governments.[5] Security sector reform has been an important component for years in many peace operations and also holds a prominent place in many of the more recently established field

[2] By 2012, the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund had supported projects related to security sector reform in 10 countries, constituting approximately $44 million, or 19 per cent of its total $228 million expenditure.

[3] "SSR and Peacebuilding: Thematic Review of Security Sector Reform (SSR) to Peacebuilding and the Role of the Peacebuilding Fund."

[4] The resolutions either explicitly mentioned the term "security sector reform", or similar terms such as "development of the security sector", "increasing the accountability of the security sector" or "building a legitimate, accountable and sustainable security sector".

[5] The peacekeeping missions include the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations Mission in Liberia, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire. The special political missions include the United Nations Office in Burundi, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia and the United Nations Support Mission in Libya. The regional offices include the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, the United Nations Office to the African Union and the United Nations Office for West Africa.

presences, such as those in Mali, South Sudan and Libya. Security sector reform is therefore an important topic for the Council and deserves further attention by its members, who are often seeking to be kept abreast of progress in security sector reform efforts in United Nations peacekeeping and political mission contexts.

- Security Council mandates are increasing not only in number but also in complexity in relation to the demands placed on support for security sector reform.[6] Across the missions, the United Nations has been called upon to provide support in a number of areas, from the development of national security strategies (e.g., in South Sudan), to support to harmonizing international coordination of security sector reform support (e.g., in Côte d'Ivoire) or encouraging and accelerating greater national ownership of security sector reform reforms (e.g., in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). There is a need, therefore, to reflect on how these increasing demands are able to be met by current United Nations capacity.

- The Secretary-General's report on security sector reform included a specific recommendation for the consideration of the Security Council. The implementation of Council mandates often depends on the extent to which they respond to national priorities and concerns. For this reason, one of the innovative recommendations in the second report of the Secretary-General is the need for the Council to consider prioritizing the early engagement of national stakeholders in the negotiations on resolutions related to security sector reform. This would merit a discussion among Council members.

What is the added value of a Council resolution at this time?

The Security Council has already discussed security sector reform in the context of three presidential statements adopted under the thematic heading of "maintenance of international peace and security" in 2007, 2008 and 2011. The statements have over the years represented important building blocks in the development of the security sector reform agenda. Some of the key messages that have been promoted are as follows:

- Security sector reform is a key element of stabilization and reconstruction in peacebuilding environments. The first presidential statement on security sector reform (S/PRST/2007/3) recognized its role in peacebuilding environments and requested the Secretary-General to produce a report, which was entitled "Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform" (A/62/659-S/2008/39).

- Security sector reform should take place within a broad framework of the rule of law. Another presidential statement supported the notion that security sector reform "must take place within a broad framework of the rule of law and should contribute to the overall strengthening of the United Nations rule of law activities" (S/PRST/2008/14).

[6] The Security Council made this observation in its presidential statement S/PRST/2011/19. This has also been recognized by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, which recognizes since 2010 the increasing demands placed on the Security Sector Reform Unit in respect of supporting United Nations missions in the field (see A/64/19, A/65/19 and A/66/19).

- Security sector reform should build on regional frameworks and national ownership. The third presidential statement noted the "importance of regional frameworks as a foundation for multilateral security sector reform efforts". At the same time, it underlined the responsibility of States to "coordinate security sector reform support, including, but not limited to, establishing a strategic vision and the parameters for reform, identifying gaps and needs, prioritizing areas for technical support, and avoiding duplication of donor efforts" (S/PRST/2011/19).

The Security Council has therefore contributed to strengthening the United Nations approach to security sector reform through various presidential statements. The time is ripe for the first Council resolution on the topic, which would enable:

- Marking both the significant achievements made in shaping the approach of the United Nations to security sector reform and the positive contribution of the agenda towards the maintenance of international peace and security. A resolution would be commensurate to the importance of security sector reform as an issue of international peace and security, not only as a key element in multidimensional peacekeeping but also as a major ingredient in the entire peacebuilding continuum. Indeed, the comprehensive approach to security sector reform developed over the past few years has offered United Nations peace operations both a strategic tool to ensure that stabilization efforts lay the groundwork for viable institution-building and long-term capacity-building in support of national reform processes, thus contributing to peace and stability, and a sustainable exit strategy.

- Signalling a change in direction of the United Nations support to security sector reform. The United Nations has consolidated its engagement at the normative level, but the time is now ripe to implement many of the recommendations in the report of the Secretary-General that relate to the Organization's operational role. The report therefore marks a turning point for the United Nations. Within this evolving context, the United Nations, and in particular its task force and Security Sector Reform Unit, is being requested to strengthen their support to national efforts in the area of security sector reform. Reflection is needed on how the United Nations can provide for more coherent and operational support on the ground, which is consistent with its capacities and modest resources.

- Addressing current challenges to the work of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform processes. There are still a number of challenges that affect the ability of the United Nations to effectively support security sector reform. For example, there is an excessive focus on "hardware" issues relating to training and equipping the security sector compared with the efforts to enhance the delivery of "software"-related support, which would entail a stronger focus on democratic governance and management of the security sector. This is despite experiences that have shown that successful security sector reform processes need to move beyond activities aiming to "train and equip" uniformed personnel towards focusing more on the strategic priorities at the level of the entire security sector architecture. This relates to a fundamental challenge in developing a shared understanding of the concept of security sector reform; a resolution would be the appropriate instrument for communicating this understanding.

- Clarifying the comparative advantages of the United Nations in the area of security sector reform and its relationship to related areas. This includes emphasizing the important role of the United Nations in laying a solid foundation for reforms by strengthening the qualitative elements of security sector governance through a sector-wide approach to security sector reform. Similarly, there is also a growing acknowledgement that the Organization's engagement in security sector reform is both a distinct discipline based on the provision of specific expertise to efforts at the sector level, but also performs an integrative function, consisting of supporting coherence and coordination among United Nations actors engaged in this area. More efforts are required to reflect this understanding in practice. This includes defining the relationship between security sector reform and the rule of law and promoting the understanding that security sector reform is critical in contributing to the rule of law as the desired end state. The linkages between security sector reform and other related areas, such as small arms and light weapons control, also need to be further considered in order to enable the provision of more coherent and coordinated support.

The Security Council should therefore seize the opportunity to make a strong statement in support of the role of the United Nations in security sector reform through the adoption of a resolution. This would follow trends seen in other related areas of United Nations work, such as combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, on which the first resolution was adopted in September 2013 (resolution 2117 (2013)) after the issuance of a number of presidential statements by the Council.

What are the issues that should be discussed in a debate in the Council in view of achieving an action-oriented resolution on security sector reform?

In view of the elements put forward in the present paper, there are a number of key issues that would deserve to be addressed in an action-oriented Security Council resolution. These include:

- Strengthening the operationalization of national ownership of security sector reform. Member States have commended the efforts of the United Nations to strengthen national ownership, including through the development of an integrated technical guidance note on the topic. More effort is required to reflect on what operationalizing national ownership means in practice and to learn from experience in the field. In this context, the Security Council should consider how it can promote the embedding of the principle of national ownership in all mission mandates and relevant Council decisions.

- Supporting the prioritization of security sector reform in missions. Despite the numerous references to security sector reform in the mandates of peacekeeping and special political missions, it is often still granted a lower order of priority within mission structures when compared with the national interest in security sector reform and the complexity of the mandated mission tasks in many contexts. The Council could consider requesting the Secretary-General to impress upon his or her Special Representatives the importance of security sector reform in the conduct of their work, including through the use of senior staff in coordinating a comprehensive approach by the mission, thus ensuring a strong link between security sector reform and other practice areas of United

Nations engagement, including with respect to justice reform, governance reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts, among others. Moreover, the important role of the good offices of the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General to move security sector reform processes forward at the strategic/political level should be encouraged.

- Clarifying understanding of the United Nations approach to security sector reform, including of its comparative advantages. Successful security sector reform is predicated on a combination of reform of individual components and sector-wide initiatives that address the strategic, policy and architectural framework of the sector. The United Nations often has a comparative advantage at the sector level. Additional attention should be given to enhancing coherence through a common understanding and appreciation of and approach to sector-wide and component-level reform, both within the Organization and with its bilateral and multilateral partners. This entails strengthening the understanding of and enhancing awareness of the Organization's role in security sector reform. For instance, enhanced focus is required on support to "software" rather than "hardware". Enhanced efforts to promote the understanding of the comparative advantages of the United Nations in sector-wide support and to clarify the relationship between security sector reform and other related processes, such as the rule of law, are also required.

- Strengthening the review of progress in security sector reform. Member States have underlined the importance of ensuring that United Nations delivery on the ground is enhanced, for instance, by reviewing progress and ensuring an appropriate focus on respect for the core principles of security sector reform. Moreover, the Secretary-General in his report called for an increased emphasis on the measurement of impact. This will require being innovative in monitoring and evaluation approaches in order to enable moving beyond the focus on measuring quantitative elements of security sector reform support to measuring qualitative aspects, which are often less visible but more important in indicating changes in peoples' lives.

- Strengthening United Nations capacity to deliver. Member States have widely commended the work and achievements of the Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force. There is a need to reflect on how best to use the existing task force mechanism to implement the recommendations outlined in the second report of the Secretary-General. Many of these essentially depend on the ability of the Task Force and its secretariat to undertake them. However, this requires ensuring that the Task Force, and in particular its secretariat, has the resources needed to take on those important roles on the basis of a more sustainable and predictable approach to funding. The Security Council should reflect on how expectations and mandates can be matched with resources.

- Strengthening the "One United Nations system" approach. In 2007 the Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force was instituted to assist in the delivery of security sector reform across the United Nations system — a philosophy known as "One United Nations". Integrated approaches to rule of law and security institution reform have been piloted for instance in the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, with the Security Sector Advisory and Coordination Division. Impetus at the Security Council level needs to be provided in order to foster enhanced mission and system-wide integration.

Charting a way forward on security sector reform

Security sector reform has grown to be a widely recognized element of the United Nations approach to peacekeeping, peacebuilding and conflict prevention. It is the responsibility of the Security Council, as the premier body in the areas of international peace and security, to ensure that the necessary priority be afforded to this critical role of the United Nations. The present paper has provided a brief overview of the landscape of security sector reform, how it relates to the work of the Security Council, the challenges of delivery and options for improvement. It is intended to lay the foundation for the adoption of a practically grounded resolution on security sector reform during the Nigerian Presidency of the Security Council, in April 2014.

United Nations S/2014/239

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 April 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 1 April 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I refer to the exchange of letters between the President of the Security Council (S/2013/765) and myself (S/2013/764), dated 24 and 20 December 2013, respectively, pertaining to the establishment of a United Nations guard unit to facilitate the implementation of the mandated tasks of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM).

I am pleased to inform you of progress made in implementing the decision of the Security Council. UNSOM has informed the Federal Government of Somalia of the decision in writing and has requested its consent to have the guard unit deployed as soon as possible. The authorities have confirmed their consent.

Meanwhile, Uganda has agreed to contribute the 410 required personnel for the guard unit from newly generated troops. They are expected to deploy by the end of April.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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United Nations A/68/826–S/2014/240

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 33 (a)
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Letter dated 1 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a Co-Chairs' statement from the high-level meeting of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform held in New York on 4 November 2013, which was signed on 19 March 2014 by the Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Africa, Ambassador Kingsley Mamabolo, and myself (see annex).

I should be grateful if you could have this statement circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 33 (a), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) František **Ružička**
Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

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Annex to the letter dated 1 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

High-level meeting of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform: strengthening the United Nations comprehensive support to security sector reform

Co-Chairs' statement

In August 2013, the second report of the Secretary-General on security sector reform was released. For the report to have its intended impact, efforts are needed to collectively reflect on the way ahead regarding the implementation of its key messages. Against this background, on 4 November 2013, the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform held a high-level meeting to launch the second report of the Secretary-General and to discuss the way forward. The meeting was chaired by the Co-Chairs of the Group of Friends, the Permanent Representatives of the Slovak Republic and the Republic of South Africa. The meeting was opened by Ambassador František Ružička, Permanent Representative of the Slovak Republic to the United Nations. The opening was followed by keynote speeches by Mr. Jan Eliasson, Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations; Mr. Noel Sinclair, Deputy Chef de Cabinet to the President of the General Assembly; and Mr. Miroslav Lajčák, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic. Ambassador Kingsley Mamabolo, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations, and Ambassador Joy Ogwu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations, also delivered key messages on the Secretary-General's report. The meeting was attended by over 120 representatives of 80 Member States.

The inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force[1] also participated in the meeting. The joint Chairs of the Task Force at the principals level, Mr. Dmitri Titov, Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and Mr. Jordan Ryan, Assistant Administrator and Director, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, United Nations Development Programme, provided their perspectives on the challenges and opportunities in implementing the report. Members of the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, also made statements recalling the linkages between security sector reform and related areas such as small arms and light weapons, anti-corruption, and countering transnational threats. Also represented was the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict.

The keynote speakers all recognized the significant achievements of the United Nations in strengthening its comprehensive support to security sector reform. The Deputy Secretary-General noted that, over the past years, security sector reform has moved from being a little known concept within the United Nations to becoming a core element of the Organization's approach to peacekeeping, peacebuilding and

[1] The inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force is composed of 14 United Nations departments, offices, agencies, funds and programmes that are engaged in support for security sector reform. See http://unssr.unlb.org/TaskForceMembers.aspx.

development. He highlighted that the future of the United Nations in security sector reform rests on the vision and support of Member States. The President of the General Assembly noted that the relevance and applicability of the report is supported by empirical evidence on the ground. Moreover, he underlined that security sector reform is an important vehicle towards supporting some of the key principles in the Charter of the United Nations such as social progress and better standards of living for the people. The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic observed that the success of the United Nations is visible in the growing demand for United Nations assistance to security sector reform efforts. Moreover, he called for measures to ensure that the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force, and its secretariat, the Security Sector Reform Unit in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, have the appropriate capabilities and resources for the challenging work ahead.

The Secretary-General's report is recognized to be a direct outcome of a Member State's initiative. Nigeria in its presidential statement of October 2011 (S/PRST/2011/19) had requested "an assessment of the United Nations support for Security Sector Reform". Numerous Member States took the floor to commend the report and to provide insights on important considerations for moving forward. This Co-Chairs' statement summarizes the main discussions and sets out priorities identified. In particular, six key areas for enhancing support were acknowledged as being of crucial importance in implementing the second report of the Secretary-General on security sector reform.

The six key areas identified are detailed below:

- Security sector reform and peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development. The challenges, opportunities and benefits of security sector reform across peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development need to be fully understood and reflected in United Nations support to security sector reform.
- The principle of national ownership. While challenges persist, particularly in fragile contexts, there is a growing body of experience and knowledge among Member States on implementing nationally owned security sector reform. The United Nations should continue to gather best practices and lessons learned.
- Partnerships with regional and subregional organizations. Existing engagement with the African Union should be deepened; at the same time partnerships should be extended beyond Africa.
- Security sector reform expertise and knowledge. The United Nations role in enabling the exchange of experience and knowledge, including South-South exchange, should be strengthened.
- Monitoring and evaluation of security sector reform. The United Nations should strengthen its role in monitoring and evaluation and should develop national capacity for monitoring and evaluation as an important element of national ownership.
- United Nations capacity to deliver. Security sector mandates in the field need to be adequately resourced; the mandate and resources of the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force and its secretariat should be reinforced to meet demand.

Security sector reform and peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development. The challenges, opportunities and benefits of security sector reform across peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development need to be fully understood and reflected in United Nations support to security sector reform.

The Secretary-General's report on security sector reform acknowledges that security sector reform has become a central component of the United Nations peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development agendas. Member States recognized that this reflects a significant cultural shift for the Organization which should be commended. However, there is a need to now focus on attaining the full potential of security sector reform across these contexts. In the area of peacekeeping, strengthening security sector reform requires an enhanced focus on support to the delivery of basic security as a means to strengthen confidence-building. Security sector reform in peacebuilding contexts also requires enhanced efforts to support inclusive national dialogue in view of strengthening the principles of democratic governance. The need to reinforce the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding remains an important challenge. Finally, in the context of development, there is an increasing understanding that security sector reform may depend on the ability to look at security through a development lens, as well as through a broader human rights lens. For instance, the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda recognizes the need to ensure that the upcoming development agenda reflects peace, security and the rule of law as critical components of the next Millennium Development Goals. Participants called for the adoption of an explicit target of reducing armed violence in the post-2015 development framework. Ultimately, the United Nations support to security sector reform across these contexts requires reflection on how to balance the need for long-term institutional reforms with the need for basic and immediate service delivery. This requires linking support to other related initiatives, such as reduction of armed violence or protection of human rights. It moreover requires a strong focus on community-based approaches and dialogue, for instance, strengthening the relationship between the security sector and communities, supporting the building of partnerships with women and youth groups among others, and supporting engagement at the local level. The United Nations is well placed to provide such holistic support to Member States across the peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development contexts because United Nations actors engaged in security sector reform cover the full spectrum. Member States underlined that security sector reform demands the combined effort of all actors across the United Nations, which points to the important role of the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force. Numerous opportunities were raised to capitalize on entry points provided by Task Force members, such as considering linking security sector reform to the work of the Office for Disarmament Affairs on the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty or to the efforts of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in countering narcotics and fighting corruption. In moving the United Nations comprehensive approach to security sector reform forward, there were also calls for enhanced cooperation across Task Force members, but also beyond, such as with the World Bank and other highly relevant institutions.

The principle of national ownership. While challenges persist, particularly in fragile contexts, there is a growing body of experience and knowledge among Member States on implementing nationally owned security sector reform. The United Nations should continue to gather best practices and lessons learned.

In line with the Secretary-General's report, the most fundamental principle of United Nations support to security sector reform is that of national ownership. Member States widely commended the United Nations for seeking to operationalize the principle of national ownership, notably through the development of the United Nations integrated technical guidance note on national ownership of security sector reform. It was underlined that a security sector that prioritizes service delivery for the people will increase the legitimacy of the State and enable political stability. National ownership should be supported through an enhanced focus on building capacity and institutional frameworks for the security sector that addresses immediate security needs. At the same time, there is a need for awareness of the existence of underlying tensions between national ownership and international support. A prime example was recognized to be that of the coordination of security sector reform efforts. There were calls among Member States for the United Nations to take up a stronger coordination role to address the often perceived lack of coherence — and at times even duplication — of international support that is prevalent across all intervention contexts. The United Nations is considered the appropriate platform for supporting international coordination due to its legitimacy and strategic role. However, there is a need to carefully balance the potential coordination role of the United Nations with national ownership by ensuring that international support is made on the basis of clearly defined national priorities. Member States shared their experiences in leading security sector reform processes that are nationally led but conducted in cooperation with international actors. It was recognized that there is a need to draw lessons from some of these successful experiences. The potential tensions between national ownership and international support were also considered to be particularly challenging in fragile contexts which are characterized by the inability of the State to ensure the delivery of basic security. Member States requested further reflection in regard to support to national ownership in these fragile contexts.

Partnerships with regional and subregional organizations. Existing engagement with the African Union should be deepened; at the same time partnerships should be extended beyond Africa.

The Secretary-General in his report calls on the United Nations to support regional and subregional organizations in developing security sector reform frameworks that build on regional perspectives. Member States recognized that the viability, legitimacy and sustainability of the United Nations approach to security sector reform depend on the extent to which it is informed by and responsive to various regional frameworks. It was underlined that such frameworks should include both policies and implementing mechanisms. In this context, the long-term partnership of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations with the African Union, which has resulted in the adoption of a continental policy for security sector reform, was commended. More efforts, however, are required to deepen such engagement through support to implementation mechanisms. At the same time, other regions should be encouraged to also develop such frameworks in order to lend a truly

global character to the work of the United Nations in this critical area. Member States called for the United Nations to support more efforts to engage with organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States, the Organization of American States, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It was noted that there is a current window of opportunity to engage with OSCE. The upcoming Swiss Chairmanship of OSCE has made strengthening security sector governance within OSCE one of the 10 priorities of its Chairmanship. Given the current reflections within OSCE, the view was raised that the time is ripe to think about revitalizing United Nations collaboration with OSCE as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the Charter in order to build on the converging interests on both sides. This could lead to an exchange of lessons learned and best practices on security sector reform support, as well as efforts towards strengthening the coherence of international support. Thus, there were calls for enhanced efforts to engage with OSCE, as well as other regional and subregional organizations, in order to support partnerships that contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of security sector reform efforts on the ground.

Security sector reform expertise and knowledge. The United Nations role in enabling the exchange of experience and knowledge, including South-South exchange, should be strengthened.

The Secretary-General in his report recognizes that Member States possess rich experiences in security sector reform which should be shared. There are a range of countries within the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform and beyond which have led their own national security sector reform processes and have significant experience to share. For instance, South Africa raised its experience in supporting an inclusive security sector reform process which among other things was anchored in the participation of women. Other Member States highlighted their experiences in supporting holistic approaches to security sector reform based on the principles of national ownership and democratic governance. It was emphasized that the United Nations needs to encourage ways to capture this knowledge and to ensure that it is made available. This requires broadening the pool of civilian experts, and exploiting the capacities that exist at both the regional and subregional levels. Member States should support specialized civilian capacities such as the United Nations security sector reform roster. At the same time, the Task Force needs to ensure that the necessary training is provided to meet the growing demand for expertise. The United Nations should also further identify innovative ways to leverage South-South cooperation into the discourse on security sector reform.

Monitoring and evaluation of security sector reform. The United Nations should strengthen its role in monitoring and evaluation and should develop national capacity for monitoring and evaluation as an important element of national ownership.

The Secretary-General in his report calls on the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force to enhance its role in monitoring and evaluating security sector reform support. It was recognized that it is the Organization's duty to ensure that its interventions are reaching their full potential and are having a meaningful impact on people's lives. Ultimately, whether citizens feel safe and have confidence in the security sector is considered to be the ultimate measure of success. Monitoring and

evaluation is an important tool for ensuring that this key objective is being met. It also enables identifying changing needs and supporting necessary adjustments within long-term support to security sector reform processes. Member States underlined that the Task Force has an important role in ensuring that United Nations delivery on the ground is enhanced, for instance, through reviewing progress and ensuring an appropriate focus on respect for the core principles of security sector reform. This will require being innovative in finding ways to move beyond the focus on measuring quantitative elements of security sector reform support to measuring qualitative aspects which are often less visible but more important in indicating changes in people's lives.

United Nations capacity to deliver. Security sector mandates in the field need to be adequately resourced; the mandate and resources of the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force and its secretariat should be reinforced to meet demand.

Member States widely commended the impressive work and significant achievements of the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force. There was a general consensus that the Task Force has played a highly important role in strengthening the United Nations comprehensive support to security sector reform. The Task Force has enhanced United Nations coherence in security sector reform support by representing a "single door" that Member States and United Nations field components can knock on to seek policy advice and technical guidance. In addition to the numerous tasks outlined in the Secretary-General's report, there is a need for the Task Force to enhance the coherent delivery of support on the ground. This includes, for instance, strengthening the United Nations role in the coordination of assistance on the ground, support to joint resource mobilization strategies, or strengthening engagement with other United Nations task forces such as the Task Force on Transnational Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking. This entails reflection on how best to use the existing task force mechanism to reach some of the next goals outlined in the report. At the same time, there is a dire need to match expectations and mandates with resources. It was recognized that a number of the priorities listed essentially depend on the ability of the Task Force and its secretariat to undertake them. However, this requires ensuring that the Task Force, and in particular its secretariat, have the necessary resources to take on their important roles based on a more permanent and predictable approach to funding.

The way forward

General consensus was reached that the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform has played an important role in supporting the strengthening of the United Nations comprehensive approach to security sector reform by providing a platform for Member States to share experience, stimulate discussion and build consensus around the agenda. While significant achievements have been consolidated by the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force, it was recognized that there will still be much work to be done in taking forward the recommendations in the second report of the Secretary-General on security sector reform. Reviewing progress and ensuring continued feedback to Member States on the implementation of these recommendations is of crucial importance and should continue to take place with

the support of the Group of Friends. In this regard, the Co-Chairs of the Group of Friends encourage the current reflections to promote, in cooperation with Security Council members, a discussion on security sector reform within the Security Council next year to further substantiate this dialogue at a higher level.

(*Signed*) František **Ružička**
Ambassador and Permanent Representative
of the Slovak Republic

(*Signed*) Kingsley **Mamabolo**
Ambassador and Permanent Representative
of the Republic of South Africa

United Nations S/2014/241

Security Council

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3 April 2014

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Letter dated 2 April 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 2100 (2013), I have the honour to transmit a note verbale dated 24 March 2014 from the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, forwarding the third report on the actions taken by the French forces in support of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) since 1 January 2014 (see annex).

I would be grateful if you could bring the present report and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Annex

[Original: French]

The Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Office of the Secretary-General and has the honour to transmit the following information.

Pursuant to paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 2100 (2013), please find attached the report of France on actions taken since 1 January 2014 by French forces in support of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

Enclosure

Third report on operational support provided by Operation Serval for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

Pursuant to paragraph 18 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2100 (2013), please find below the report of France on actions taken since 1 January 2014 by French forces in support of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). This report is the third of its kind since MINUSMA was established.

Since 1 January 2014, there has been one intervention by Operation Serval in response to an "imminent and serious threat" against MINUSMA.

On 11 January 2014, while on patrol to the northeast of Aguelhok, south of Tessalit, a detachment of the Chadian battalion of MINUSMA was engaged by armed terrorist groups, leaving three Chadian soldiers wounded. At the request of MINUSMA headquarters and in order to support the Chadian battalion, Operation Serval took the following actions:

- Diverted a French intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance unit to the engagement area to gather information needed to support the medical evacuation operation
- Issued the medical evacuation alert and put the French CASA "Nurse" aircraft on standby in Gao
- Evacuated the three wounded Chadian soldiers from Aguelhok to Kidal in a French medical evacuation helicopter
- Evacuated the three wounded Chadian soldiers from Kidal to Gao in the French CASA "Nurse" aircraft.

Operation Serval also provided support for medical evacuations, including evacuations carried out independently by MINUSMA (involvement of Operation Serval forward medical teams). For example, on 16 March 2014, a vehicle from the Chadian battalion struck an improvised explosive device 60 km from Tessalit. In all, three Chadian soldiers were slightly injured. The wounded were evacuated to Tessalit by the Chadian battalion. In Tessalit, they were assessed by Operation Serval's forward medical team. The Operation Serval CASA "Nurse" aircraft was put on standby but, in the end, the wounded were evacuated to Gao by MINUSMA.

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Security Council

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3 April 2014

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Report of the Security Council mission to Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone, 18 to 24 May 2012

I. Introduction

1. In his letter dated 18 May 2012 (S/2012/344), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council had agreed to send a mission to Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and Sierra Leone from 18 to 24 May 2012. The Liberia segment of the mission was co-led by Ambassador Susan Rice of the United States of America and Ambassador Mohammed Loulichki of Morocco. The Côte d'Ivoire and ECOWAS segment of the mission was co-led by Ambassador Gérard Araud of France and Ambassador Kodjo Menan of Togo. The Sierra Leone segment of the mission was co-led by Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ambassador Baso Sangqu of South Africa. The terms of reference of the mission are set out in the annex to document S/2012/344. The composition of the mission is set out below:

Ambassador Agshin Mehdiyev (Azerbaijan)

Counsellor Tian Lin (China)

Ambassador Néstor Osorio (Colombia)

Ambassador Gérard Araud (France)

Ambassador Peter Wittig (Germany)

Ambassador Gert Rosenthal (Guatemala)

Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri (India)

Ambassador Mohammed Loulichki (Morocco)

Ambassador Raza Bashir Tarar (Pakistan)

Ambassador João Cabral (Portugal)

Ambassador Nikita Zhukov (Russian Federation)

Ambassador Baso Sangqu (South Africa)

Ambassador Kodjo Menan (Togo)

Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant (United Kingdom)

Ambassador Susan Rice (United States)

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2. The present report of the Security Council mission to West Africa from 18 to 24 May 2012 has three sections, covering the Council's visits to Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone. The present report follows the briefing to the Council by the respective heads of the Security Council mission to West Africa on 31 May 2012.

II. Liberia

A. Background and context

3. Since the Council's last visit to Liberia in May 2009, significant progress has been made in that country, taking into account the devastation caused by the civil war that ended in 2003. With the generally peaceful conduct of the 2011 elections — the second elections since the end of the war — Liberia passed a critical milestone, which was cemented with the inauguration of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf on 16 January 2012.

4. Liberia no longer faces direct internal or external military threats, but latent security threats from within the country, including civil unrest, could undermine its stability. In pockets of the country, particularly the border areas, former combatants, some of whom are armed, maintain command-and-control structures that have been mobilized during and since the 2011 Ivorian crisis. A major threat emanates from the large population of unskilled, unemployed youths, many of them former combatants lacking livelihood opportunities, while long-standing divisions on the basis of ethnicity, politics and religion as well as land disputes are another source of tension. The root causes of the country's conflict have yet to be fully addressed, including a divided society, economic inequality, corruption, nepotism, impunity, political exclusion and marginalization of certain groups and communities, human rights violations and fragile State institutions. Meanwhile, insufficient progress has been made with respect to national reconciliation.

5. Liberia continues to be affected by the situation in the subregion and there remains a need for the development of national and regional capacities and strategies to respond to subregional threats to peace and security, including drug and weapons trafficking and illegal exploitation of natural resources. Cross-border movements of armed elements, including former combatants from Côte d'Ivoire, are a significant threat, and the continuing presence of some 65,000 refugees, out of some 190,000 Ivorian refugees who had entered Liberia during the post-elections crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, presents challenges for the Government and strains host communities.

6. The United Nations technical assessment mission of February 2012 assessed multiple issues and, while balancing the institutional progress made so far with the need to ensure a steady state of security, made a range of findings related to the future of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), including its reconfiguration, which were reflected in the recommendations contained in the special report of the Secretary-General on UNMIL of 16 April 2012 (S/2012/230).

B. Security Council mission

7. The Security Council visited Liberia on 19 and 20 May 2012, and also visited Zwedru in Grand Gedeh County, eastern Liberia, on 22 May.

8. The Security Council's visit aimed to reaffirm its continuing support for the Government and people of Liberia; and to express support for UNMIL and to review progress in the implementation of its mandate and assess the modalities for its reconfiguration in the light of the Secretary-General's special report on UNMIL of 16 April 2012. Members of the Council sought to assess the operational capacity and sustainability of the Liberia National Police and other national security institutions and the progress made in determining the appropriate role for the Armed Forces of Liberia; to encourage the Government to decentralize functions of national security institutions beyond Monrovia; and to develop the justice and corrections sectors, taking into account the reconfiguration of UNMIL. The Council also aimed to encourage the efforts of the Government to promote national reconciliation, combat corruption and promote good governance, while addressing political divisions and ensuring inclusiveness. Furthermore, the Council sought to assess security challenges along the Ivorian border; to assess and encourage inter-mission cooperation between the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and UNMIL; to focus on illicit weapons flows in the region and explore strengthening regional cooperation; and to emphasize the importance of protecting human rights and combating sexual and gender-based violence. The Council also sought to assess the performance of the Peacebuilding Commission and to underline the need for the full implementation of the Security Council's sanctions regime on Liberia.

9. The Security Council mission met with President Johnson Sirleaf and members of her Cabinet, including Ministers of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Information, National Defence, Justice, Gender and Development, as well as the National Security Adviser. The members of the mission also visited the National Police Training Academy where the Minister of Justice and heads of Liberian security agencies briefed them. The mission met with representatives of civilian society; paid a visit to a workshop conducted by the quick-impact project, "Alternative livelihoods project for traditional women" at Kortu Town; met with the management of the Firestone Corporation; and was briefed by the senior leadership of UNMIL and the United Nations country team.

Meeting with the President and members of her Cabinet

10. At the meeting on 19 May, the President noted continued progress in socioeconomic recovery and peace consolidation since the Council's last visit in 2009, praising the strong partnership between the Government and UNMIL. She stated that the annual economic growth was 6.5 per cent, despite the global economic crisis. Liberia achieved the completion point of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in June 2010, which allowed for some $5 billion of the country's debt to be written off. Adding that the Government was working on mobilizing private investment, adjusting legislation, formulating strategies and improving governance, she emphasized that some progress has been made in restoring infrastructure, including building new schools and hospitals as well as repairing roads and bridges.

11. The President stressed that, although important strides had been made in recent years, the coming five years would be even more important as they would mark the implementation of a long-term transformational agenda aimed at making Liberia a middle-income country, namely, "Liberia Rising: Vision 2030". She noted that the Government's priorities included enhancing security and rule of law institutions, pursuing economic and human development, promoting good governance, and modernizing public institutions. The President identified youth education and employment, reform of the rule of law and the security sector to ensure access to equitable justice, infrastructure development, and ensuring an inclusive reconciliation process as key challenges, while highlighting the importance of the role of UNMIL in maintaining an environment conducive to peace consolidation.

12. The President expressed concern that Liberia could be further affected by spillover from potential instability in the subregion, adding that the elections in Guinea and Sierra Leone scheduled for 2012 needed to be carefully monitored. She further added that Liberia maintained excellent cooperation with its neighbours in the framework of both the Mano River Union and ECOWAS, and actively assisted the latter's efforts to address the crises in Mali and Guinea-Bissau.

13. In responding to questions from the Security Council members, the President stated that the Government was fully committed to national reconciliation, while stressing that the Independent National Commission on Human Rights continued to be in the lead for the implementation of the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. She acknowledged that corruption continued to be a serious problem. According to the President, fighting corruption should include both prevention and punishment by improving systems of control in Government institutions, further refining administrative structures, introducing new laws, and building the capacity of the judiciary. She expressed hope that a new generation of young people would work for the Government to bring the necessary fresh mindset to successfully eradicating corruption. She stated that the Government had extended the moratorium on sales of publicly-owned land to prevent abuse. The land-generated disputes were a serious problem, which were compounded by territorial disputes among the various counties, which the Government had to address.

14. The President stressed that her Government had always complied with the sanctions regime. She noted, however, that some of the individuals on the travel ban list no longer presented a threat, and suggested that the Council consider delisting them. The President also acknowledged that the asset freeze was not implemented in Liberia owing to legal difficulties, including the need to respect the right to due process.

15. Finally, the President confirmed that the Government had accepted the recommendations of the Secretary-General on the gradual reconfiguration of UNMIL, and would work closely with the Mission in order to build Liberia's capacity in the rule of law and security sectors. She called for greater international support for Liberia's police in line with the expected drawdown of UNMIL troops. She also noted that the professionalism of the national police was sometimes lacking and more efforts should be invested to improve police force training, while increasing its strength. The President referred to Sierra Leone, which has approximately 12,000 police personnel, compared to some 4,000 in Liberia. She underlined the challenge of the multinational assistance provided to the police through the UNMIL police component, given different standards and methodologies,

and noted that Liberia would explore the possibility of a lead nation to support the Liberian police.

16. At the same meeting, the Minister for Finance and Economic Planning noted that the implementation of "Liberia Rising: Vision 2030" would address, inter alia, such important issues as land ownership, citizenship, national identity and reconciliation. The Minister said that the Government intended to spend some $50 million over the next three years for youth-related projects, as over 60 per cent of Liberians younger than 25 years old are unemployed. He stated that the Government planned to provide funding for the five regional justice and security hubs being built with the assistance of the Peacebuilding Commission. The President stressed that the hubs were an integral part of the security transition from UNMIL to national authorities, adding that the Government was committed to strictly adhering to the construction schedule and the deployment of police and judiciary personnel in the hubs.

17. The Minister of Justice echoed the importance of the justice and security hubs, which would allow the Government to significantly expand its capacity to provide justice and security services to the population beyond Monrovia in a decentralized manner. The Minister also said that the Drug Enforcement Agency faced new challenges in dealing with drug and other illicit trafficking, adding that the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization was working to enhance its control over State borders. Serious concern was also expressed with regard to the presence of armed former combatants in eastern Liberia. The Minister of Justice also stressed judicial reform and efforts to reduce the high number of pretrial detentions, including by using alternative community-based approaches. She hoped that construction of a new central prison in Monrovia would alleviate the serious overcrowding in penitentiary facilities.

18. The Minister of Defence praised the work of the Government and UNMIL in preparing for the hand-over of security responsibilities from UNMIL to national authorities. However, he advised that the Government would need to provide some $72 million over the next three years to fill critical gaps identified in the security sector. He thanked the United States for its important contribution and leadership in the establishment of the armed forces of Liberia and expressed appreciation to ECOWAS countries, particularly Nigeria and Ghana, which provided officers to help train the armed forces. The Minister said that, although their size was modest, the armed forces could deploy in the border areas of the country and could also be used to help repair infrastructure such as bridges and roads. With regard to questions concerning the high rate of attrition in the armed forces, the President explained that initially the military barracks were built for soldiers without families but that the military personnel had been allowed to bring their families, which had led to overcrowding and deterioration in their living conditions. She advised that additional financial allocations from the State budget would be provided to improve their living conditions and welfare.

19. Members of the Security Council mission commended the progress made since the end of the conflict and stressed the importance of further advances in the reform of the rule of law, the security sector, national reconciliation, political inclusiveness, and extension of State authority throughout the country, while addressing urgent socioeconomic priorities, including fighting corruption, as well as the situation of youth and gender mainstreaming.

Meeting with the Minister of Justice and heads of national security institutions

20. While at the National Police Academy, the mission met with the Minister of Justice, as well as the heads of the Liberia National Police, the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and the Drug Enforcement Agency. The Minister of Justice described Liberia's preparations for the gradual drawdown of UNMIL and requested continued coordination with UNMIL to ensure a smooth transition. She reiterated that the justice and security hubs were an integral component of the Government's plan for transition.

21. The heads of Liberia's security institutions noted that the performance and operations of the rule of law and security agencies were constrained by many shortages, including in transportation, communications, accommodation, and other logistical challenges. It was emphasized that, to enable it to become an effective security provider, the strength of the Liberian police needed to be doubled, to about 8,000 police officers. The Minister of Justice acknowledged the need for increased financial support for the security sector. In connection with the support for the national police, the Minister of Justice echoed the President, saying that Liberia would consider seeking the possibility of a lead nation to support the police.

22. New threats to Liberia's stability from drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea were highlighted as challenges, which Government security institutions could not address on their own and for which they needed international assistance, including from UNMIL. Liberia's participation in the West Africa Coast Initiative and the recent establishment of the Transnational Crime Unit were highlighted as positive steps.

Meeting with civil society, including visit to Kortu Town

23. The Security Council meeting with some 30 representatives of civil society focused on the obstacles to lasting national reconciliation. Civil society representatives expressed appreciation for the efforts of UNMIL to stabilize the country and expressed concern about the Mission's reconfiguration, stressing that many Liberians felt that the peace was still very fragile, while the national capacity to provide security needed more time to become self-sustainable. They called for the continued presence of UNMIL in Liberia. Civil society representatives also expressed concern at continuing economic disparities and corruption. In connection with the recent verdict of the Special Court for Sierra Leone regarding the former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, some opined that those who had committed atrocities during the conflict should be prosecuted for their actions in Liberia, as had occurred in Sierra Leone and Rwanda, otherwise impunity might lead to the recurrence of abuses. They also pressed for increasing the role and voice of women in government and for enhanced interreligious dialogue.

24. The Security Council mission visited an UNMIL quick-impact project in Kortu Town near Monrovia, which funded an alternative livelihood project for traditional women, focusing on training in fabric and soap processing and basic tailoring. Members of the women's group explained that the project provided opportunities for alternative income generation as opposed to continuing the harmful practice of female genital mutilation upon girls and women. The women's group stressed that the project helped to change public perceptions of and assisted the entire community in addressing issues that were initially thought too sensitive for discussion.

Meeting with a representative of the business community

25. The Security Council mission visited the headquarters of the Firestone Natural Rubber Company, a subsidiary of the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, which operates the largest contiguous rubber plantation in the world and is one of Liberia's top employers. The mission discussed the opportunities and challenges facing the business community in Liberia with the company's management, which stated that the presence of UNMIL had greatly contributed to establishing stability and consolidating peace, which were essential for successful operations.

Briefing by UNMIL and the country team on the security situation and United Nations priorities

26. The Security Council mission met with the senior leadership of UNMIL and the United Nations country team, hosted by the Indian all-female formed police unit, which demonstrated the value of women's participation in Liberia's security institutions. UNMIL confirmed to the mission that the post-elections crisis in Côte d'Ivoire presented a critical challenge to Liberia, as tens of thousands of Ivorian refugees who remained in Liberia were putting pressure on already fragile subsistence communities. There were also serious concerns about the presence of weapons in the border areas and the unknown intentions of former combatants. UNMIL advised that inter-mission cooperation between UNMIL and UNOCI had been stepped up in order to provide enhanced stability and support for national authorities in the border areas.

27. UNMIL advised that it was implementing a holistic approach to justice and security through the integration of justice, police, corrections and human rights in the UNMIL rule of law pillar, and through developing, in close cooperation with the Government, a three-year Joint Programme on Justice and Security, building upon the Liberia Peacebuilding Programme, which coherently captures rule of law and security priorities. The Joint Programme brought together the Government, the United Nations, donors and civil society in its management structures and was supported by a multi-donor Justice and Security Trust Fund and the Peacebuilding Fund.

28. The UNMIL leadership expressed concern about the limited size and capacity of the Liberia national police, including the armed Emergency Response Unit and the Police Support Unit, and stressed that it would need to provide further assistance to the police, which many believed would need to double its size. While the national police and, to a lesser extent, the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization have established a minimal presence throughout the country, in instances of serious violence the Liberian security agencies still rely on UNMIL for support.

29. At the same time, the judicial sector experienced a severe lack of capacity, which led, inter alia, to a backlog of cases, an unacceptable level of pretrial detention and serious overcrowding in some prisons. Owing to the lack of access to and confidence in the formal justice system, the population continued to seek assistance from the informal justice system to resolve disputes, particularly in the provinces.

30. The United Nations leadership stressed that sexual and gender-based violence was a daunting challenge, and that domestic violence was common and female genital mutilation was widely practised. Liberia's human rights situation was

complicated by a number of discriminatory laws, which have been identified by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as being associated with the root causes of the conflict.

C. Recommendations

31. Taking into account the views expressed by the mission's interlocutors and conclusions drawn from the various exchanges, the members of the Council recommend:

(a) UNMIL should continue to strive to meet the strategic goal set by the Security Council, namely, to assist Liberia to achieve a steady state of security with national security institutions that are able to sustain stability independently of the peacekeeping mission, while maintaining the strong partnership between the United Nations and the Government and people of Liberia;

(b) The reconfiguration of UNMIL should proceed in a gradual manner, with reductions in the Mission strength commensurate with the building of national capacity, allowing for the assumption of security responsibilities by the national authorities. In this regard, the Government is encouraged to redouble its efforts to build strong, professional and responsible rule of law and security agencies, underpinned by increased funding and effective oversight mechanisms. The Government is also invited to continue exploring bilateral or regional support arrangements in preparation for further stages in the UNMIL reconfiguration. Donors should increase assistance aimed at enhancing the Liberian rule of law and security sectors;

(c) Transition should take into account broader challenges that go beyond security institutions, including governance and the rule of law, which are necessary to sustain the security transition. The Government, the United Nations and multilateral and bilateral partners are encouraged to address those challenges drawing on the important mechanisms already in place, such as the Joint Programme on Justice and Security, including the Liberia Peacebuilding Programme;

(d) The Government should redouble its efforts to combat sexual and gender-based violence;

(e) As Liberia's stability depends on the situation in the subregion, which remains a matter of concern, initiatives fostered in the context of the Mano River Union and ECOWAS aimed at strengthening subregional stability are encouraged.

III. Côte d'Ivoire

A. Background and context

32. The Security Council mission was conducted one year after the end of the violent post-elections crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, which cost at least 3,000 lives. Since then, the Government has made substantial progress in stabilizing the security situation, including by reconstituting and redeploying the security and rule of law institutions; taking first steps towards reconciliation; and accelerating economic recovery and reconstruction. This progress notwithstanding, significant challenges

remain as the crisis exacerbated existing problems and created new ones, as a result of the disintegration of the security apparatus, the collapse of State authority, the creation of the new armed forces (Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI)) followed by ad hoc recruitment, the involvement of militias and foreign combatants in the crisis, the proliferation of weapons and the presence of key representatives of the former regime exiled in countries in the subregion. The proliferation of weapons and slow progress in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration have contributed to a higher incidence of violent crimes throughout the country, such as armed robberies, looting and racketeering, including by the armed forces and other armed elements.

33. Efforts by the Government to address immediate security challenges with the support of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire improved the security situation in parts of the country, particularly in Abidjan. However, the situation in the west remains volatile. This region was the most affected by the recent crisis and is an area where State authority has been traditionally weak and access to basic services limited. The return of displaced persons and refugees has exacerbated existing tensions and resulted in an increasing number of clashes between communities, mostly as a result of land disputes. Continuing cross-border movements of armed elements and weapons and illicit trafficking in the border area between Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia present a significant threat for both countries. Several violent attacks by unidentified armed elements on villages in the densely forested border area have been reported since the end of the crisis, with reports that some attacks were carried out by armed elements which entered Côte d'Ivoire from Liberia.

34. The armed forces created by the President, Alassane Ouattara, are composed of the former Forces de défense et de sécurité and the Forces nouvelles. In spite of measures taken by the Government to address shortcomings within the armed forces, the latter grapple with command and control issues, ill-discipline and lack of cohesion. The future of tens of thousands of elements associated with the armed forces who were recruited on an ad hoc basis during the crisis remains uncertain. Many of them will have to undergo disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Estimates of the total caseload range from 60,000 to over 100,000 former combatants. Although the President has taken security sector reform under his purview and a national working group on security sector reform was established on 6 April, progress has been slow in moving these critical processes forward.

35. On the political front, legislative elections, the first since 2000, were successfully conducted in December 2011, although boycotted by the former ruling Front populaire ivoirien (FPI) party, and the National Assembly was inaugurated on 25 April. President Ouattara also established a Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The Prime Minister chaired a meeting with extra-parliamentary opposition parties on 27 and 28 March in Grand-Bassam to discuss their grievances, and a permanent framework for dialogue was subsequently established to continue this political dialogue. On several occasions, the Government has reiterated its intention to hold local elections by the end of 2012, though the date has yet to be determined.

B. Security Council mission

36. The Security Council mission visited Côte d'Ivoire on 21 and 22 May, including Guiglo in western Côte d'Ivoire. The mission also paid a visit to Zwedru in eastern Liberia to meet with Ivorian refugees on 22 May. This was the first mission of the Security Council to Côte d'Ivoire since 2008.

37. One of the key objectives of the Security Council's mission to Côte d'Ivoire was to welcome the progress towards restoring stability and peace since the end of the post-elections crisis and to reaffirm the Council's continuing support. The Council also sought to assess the progress made by the Government with the assistance of UNOCI in stabilizing the security situation in Abidjan and the rest of the country, in particular the border area between Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, and to encourage inter-mission cooperation between UNOCI and UNMIL. In addition, the Council sought to assess progress made in security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, while encouraging the Government to develop and implement a comprehensive national security sector reform plan and to encourage UNOCI and the United Nations country team to assist in this regard. Further to the successful holding of legislative elections, the Council sought to encourage the Government to continue reaching out to the political opposition and to encourage political parties to engage constructively in political life, while calling on the Government and all Ivorian actors to join their efforts to promote reconciliation at national and local levels; ensure inclusive governance and impartial justice; fight impunity; and address the root causes of the Ivorian crisis. Looking ahead, the Council also sought to engage with UNOCI on its future, on the basis of the recommendations contained in the special report of the Security-General on UNOCI of 29 March 2012 (S/2012/186).

38. In Abidjan, the mission met with President Alassane Ouattara, the Prime Minister, Jeannot Kouadio-Ahoussou, and Government ministers, including the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, the Interior, Economy and Finance, Employment, Planning and Development, Human Rights, and Ex-Combatants, as well as the ministers in charge of Defence and Justice. The mission also met with the President of the National Assembly, Guillaume Soro, members of his Bureau and leaders of the parliamentary groups; representatives of the political opposition, including the former ruling FPI party; the President of the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Charles Konan Banny, and members of the Commission; representatives of civil society; as well as senior staff of UNOCI and the United Nations country team.

Meeting with the President

39. The President thanked the Security Council for its engagement in Côte d'Ivoire since 2004, in particular for the decisive action taken during the post-election crisis, which he said saved many lives. He provided the Council with an overview of efforts undertaken by his Government to stabilize the security situation and promote reconciliation as well as economic recovery. Reiterating his commitment to reconciliation, he noted that, in addition to establishing the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Government had made numerous efforts to reach out to the former ruling political party and other opposition parties, particularly when forming the Government and in inviting the opposition political parties to a meeting to initiate political dialogue. He noted that

the Government would welcome the participation of the opposition parties in the local elections to be held by the end of 2012, adding that this would be an opportunity for them to participate in governance. The President also noted that his recent visit to western Côte d'Ivoire was aimed at promoting reconciliation in the area most affected by the recent crisis. Recognizing the need to address the root causes of conflict, in particular land tenure issues, the President noted that this issue was to be examined by the recently established National Assembly. In response to a question on how to balance justice and reconciliation, the President stressed that reconciliation must go hand in hand with justice. Noting that a system of equitable justice was in place to ensure that all perpetrators would be brought to justice irrespective of their political affiliation, he stated that the conditions posed by the former ruling party to release former President Laurent Gbagbo from detention were therefore unacceptable.

40. The President expressed concern about the security situation in border areas, in particular along the border with Liberia, recognizing that it was difficult to control this vast and densely forested area. He stated that, although collaboration between Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia was excellent in this regard, the lack of appropriate transportation and communication and surveillance equipment had hampered the ability of the authorities to address border security challenges. He also expressed concern about potential destabilization from elements affiliated with former President Gbagbo, who had fled during and after the crisis to countries in the subregion, adding that international arrest warrants had been issued for some members of the former regime present in Ghana.

41. On security sector reform, the President recognized that integrating the two armies into the new national army was a challenging process, adding that the reunification had been accomplished although the forces lacked training and equipment, partly as a result of the sanctions regime. He recognized that security sector reform was a critical priority, emphasizing that he had taken this portfolio under his purview, while working closely with relevant ministers and heads of the security agencies. He expressed concern about the large number of former combatants and stressed the need for assistance to find solutions for some 50,000 young people who had taken up weapons during the post-elections crisis. He called for continued assistance for security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration by the United Nations and bilateral partners, including through the creation of jobs and the provision of skills training, while also collecting the large number of weapons that remain in the country.

42. The President emphasized progress made towards reconstruction and economic development. He noted that by the end of June Côte d'Ivoire should be eligible for debt relief under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. In spite of the economic growth of recent months, he noted that challenges remain and half of the population still lives below the poverty line. He identified job creation, especially for the youth, as well as reforms in the health and education sectors, as priorities for development. Noting the need for enhanced investment in Côte d'Ivoire, he expressed the hope that the United Nations would revise the security level classification for its personnel in the country, as this would serve as a positive reference for investors.

43. In his capacity as the Chair of ECOWAS, the President also provided an update on the situation in the subregion, including Mali and Guinea-Bissau where

coups d'état had been carried out since he had assumed his function in February 2012. He expressed particular concern about the situation in northern Mali, noting that terrorism and illicit trafficking constitute a serious threat to the subregion with far-reaching consequences. The President advised that ECOWAS was reflecting on measures to prevent coups d'état in the subregion, including through the creation of a regional electoral observation mechanism, as elections were identified as a major source of instability.

44. The Security Council mission was encouraged by the gradual improvement of the situation in Côte d'Ivoire since the violent post-elections crisis and the holding of legislative elections. The mission recognized a number of challenges the country is facing, including the security situation in the border areas; security sector reform; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; and the balance between justice and reconciliation. The Council reaffirmed its continuing support, while noting the need for reviews of the peacekeeping operations and progressive adjustments as well as a gradual transition over time. In response to calls by the Ivorian authorities to lift the arms embargo, the mission clarified that the sanctions regime was not designed to prevent the Government from adequately equipping its security forces but to prevent the import of arms that could fall into the wrong hands, noting that it was easy to obtain exemptions for the Government to meet justified needs.

Meeting with the Prime Minister and Government ministers

45. The Prime Minister and Government ministers reflected on the main challenges Côte d'Ivoire is facing as a result of the post-elections crisis. Noting the collapse of State authority during the crisis, the Prime Minister stressed the need to rebuild a State that recognizes the rights of its citizens and ensures access to basic services, while reiterating the Government's determination to bring perpetrators to justice irrespective of their political affiliation.

46. The Minister of the Interior recognized that the security situation remained fragile, in particular along the border with Liberia, stressing the need for enhanced support from the United Nations to address cross-border movements of armed elements and weapons. He added that United Nations support remains critical for the reform of the security sector, in particular through the provision of training and equipment, as well as for the holding of local elections. The Minister of Defence identified the presence of political exiles in the subregion as a potential threat as well as the presence of large numbers of former combatants, some of whom had been integrated into the armed forces without training. The Minister for Foreign Affairs drew attention to displaced persons, including some 65,000 refugees in the subregion, noting that sustainable return remained a challenge. He also underlined the need to address subregional threats, including piracy and drug trafficking. The Minister for Planning and Development emphasized that economic recovery and improved access to basic services would accelerate reconciliation.

47. During the discussion, the Security Council commended the progress made since the end of the post-elections crisis and stressed the importance of concrete measures to make progress in the reform of security and rule of law institutions, national reconciliation and the restoration of State authority and to find solutions for the reintegration of former combatants.

Meeting with the National Assembly

48. The Security Council also met with the President of the newly-established National Assembly, members of its Bureau and leaders of the parliamentary groups. The President of the National Assembly reiterated the commitment of the Assembly to truly represent the Ivorian people and to build a strong and independent institution, while introducing some checks and balances on the Government and contributing to national reconciliation. During the discussion, the Council noted the need for the National Assembly to play a role in addressing national reconciliation, security sector reform and root causes of the conflict, particularly land ownership issues. The Council stressed the importance of the National Assembly's role in consolidating democracy in Côte d'Ivoire.

Meeting with the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission

49. The President of the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission noted that consultations would be held across the country to ensure the inclusiveness of the process and ownership by the population, while at the same time local commissions were being established to facilitate dialogue at the local level. He stressed that justice and reconciliation were two separate processes. He explained that the Commission would be seeking the truth and facilitating forgiveness, while the justice system would work in parallel to ensure that perpetrators of serious human rights violations would be held accountable. Noting that dialogue may not be sufficient to achieve reconciliation, he underlined the need for reparations for victims. During the discussion, the Security Council also stressed the need for real ownership of the process by the population as well as adequate documentation of the process.

Meeting with the political opposition

50. The meeting with representatives of political opposition parties illustrated the deep divisions that remain in Ivorian society, with representatives of the former ruling political party questioning the credibility of the elections and the Government's legitimacy. The main concerns raised by the representatives of the political opposition included partisan justice; acts of reprisals and attacks against them by elements of the armed forces, including illegal detention and torture; the lack of political space; and what they perceived as the lack of freedom of assembly and expression. They felt that the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission was ineffective, stating that they had no faith in it, while reiterating their conditions for participation in the process, including amnesty; the release of former President Gbagbo and other detainees associated with the former regime; the return of all persons from exile; the holding of new presidential, legislative and local elections; the disarmament of former combatants; the withdrawal of UNOCI; and the lifting of the sanctions regime. While participation in the local elections was categorically rejected by the former ruling party, some representatives indicated that they might consider participating.

Meeting with civil society

51. Representatives of civil society, including religious and traditional leaders, expressed concern about the continuing circulation of weapons and human rights violations committed by armed elements, including by the armed forces, and the

slow progress in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. They also deplored the lack of progress in national reconciliation. Some felt that this was due to the ineffectiveness of the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, while others were of the view that it was the result of impunity. They also highlighted the need to address land tenure issues, which were identified as the main source of inter-community violence, including through a review of the relevant legislation. Concerns were also raised about gender-based violence and the lack of a comprehensive legal framework to protect women against all forms of violence, while the need for increased participation of women in national reconciliation, as well as in key reform and decision-making processes, was stressed.

Visit to western Côte d'Ivoire and eastern Liberia

Meeting with local authorities and representatives of the population in Guiglo

52. In Guiglo, the Security Council met with local authorities to discuss the situation in western Côte d'Ivoire. The large numbers of weapons and armed elements in the area were identified as major challenges, and it was noted that only six weapons had been collected in the area. Representatives of the law enforcement agencies noted the difficulty in addressing border security challenges owing to lack of capacity and adequate equipment. The prefect noted that, although most of the displaced persons in the area had returned, sustaining these returns was a challenge. He added that the local early warning and sensitization committee — comprising traditional leaders, local authorities, political parties and civil society — had commenced its work and produced initial results, while highlighting the need to reinforce its capacities. Representatives of the local population raised concerns about prevailing insecurity, the continuing presence of weapons, some of which are allegedly hidden in the border area, human rights violations committed by the armed forces and other armed elements, and lack of access to basic services. They called on UNOCI to enhance its efforts to protect civilians.

53. UNOCI briefed the Security Council on efforts under way to protect civilians in this volatile region, including through increasing its presence. The Mission has established new offices in the area along the border with Liberia, namely in Tai and Toulepleu, and is in the process of reinforcing its presence in Guiglo. UNOCI and the country team advised that they had also revised the system-wide strategy on protection of civilians to take into account the new realities on the ground and the specific needs of vulnerable groups, while optimizing the use of existing resources. UNOCI is also working with local security committees and supporting the activities of the early warning and sensitization committees in charge of prevention and management of local conflicts.

Visit to refugee camp in eastern Liberia

54. On 22 May, the Security Council travelled from Guiglo to eastern Liberia to visit the Prime Timber Production refugee camp located in Zwedru, Grand Gedeh County, in the vicinity of the Ivorian border. The Council was briefed by the Executive Director of the Liberia Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission and by a representative of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the Ivorian refugee situation in the eastern part of Liberia. The camp is one of six camps established in eastern Liberia in 2011 to receive Ivorian refugees, housing 7,000 of the remaining 65,000 refugees. The

Council heard from refugee representatives and refugees themselves who shared their experiences, their hopes, and what they perceived as obstacles to their return to Côte d'Ivoire. Although the majority of Ivorian refugees have returned home, those that remained cited fear of persecution as well as land expropriation as reasons preventing their return to Côte d'Ivoire. It appeared that accurate, timely reporting on the situation from their homes could help to counteract rumours and inaccurate information that circulated within the camps. Some refugees said they would not return until President Ouattara was gone, if at all.

Inter-mission cooperation

55. Before leaving Zwedru, the Security Council delegation was briefed on inter-mission cooperation alongside the Liberian-Ivorian border. They noted the various security challenges that emerged following the Ivorian crisis, as well as the innovative joint steps the missions have taken to strengthen coordination and cooperation to better monitor the border situation, including through the sharing of assets, and to facilitate refugee repatriation. A joint security strategy for coordination, information-sharing and joint response has been developed by the two missions, while regular meetings are being held, bringing together UNMIL and UNOCI as well as national counterparts. They also mentioned the need to include civilian agencies in the strategy, devise ways to improve information-sharing and align messages, particularly regarding the humanitarian effort.

C. Meeting of the Security Council and the Economic Community of West African States

56. On 21 May 2012, the Security Council mission met with a high-level delegation of the Economic Community of West African States in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire. This was the first such meeting between Council members and ECOWAS. Participants included the President of the ECOWAS Commission, Kadré Désiré Ouédraogo, the Foreign Ministers of Côte d'Ivoire (current Chair of ECOWAS), Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, the Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Senegal, as well as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa, Said Djinnit, and the Secretary General of the Mano River Union, Hadja Saran Daraba Kabba. Benin also attended as the current Chair of the African Union. The in-depth discussions focused on the situations in Mali and Guinea-Bissau.

57. The Foreign Minister of Côte d'Ivoire described the institutional crisis that had stemmed from the coup d'état of 22 March in Mali. He recalled that plans for the Chair of ECOWAS to meet with the junta in the early stages of the crisis could not go forward, owing to events on the ground, which had led to the imposition of a range of economic, diplomatic and financial sanctions. Those measures had subsequently been lifted once a transition of power was agreed with the junta.

58. The President of the ECOWAS Commission added that the transitional institutions had been functioning until actions on the ground had led ECOWAS to believe that the conditions for the transition were not being observed, and the reimposition of sanctions had been threatened on 15 May. As at 20 May, there had been hope that all parties would agree to a 12-month period of transition with an interim president and institutions. The proposal that Captain Sanogo would enjoy the same benefits as a former Head of State of Mali had been proposed by the

Malian authorities as "the price of peace", but this had not been acceptable to ECOWAS. Several Security Council members agreed that conveying former Head of State status on Captain Sanogo would be "unsavoury", and would set a bad precedent.

59. In response to questions from Security Council members on recently unfolding events in Mali, the Foreign Minister of Burkina Faso reported that earlier on that same day groups of hostile and well organized demonstrators had gone to the presidential palace in Bamako, had crossed the security barriers, and had physically assaulted the interim President, Dioncounda Traoré, who had been taken to the hospital with a head wound.

60. Members of the Security Council and the representatives of ECOWAS and its member States subsequently held an exchange of views on the causes and meaning of the day's events in Mali, and discussed in detail various aspects of a proposed ECOWAS deployment force to restore peace and ensure the territorial integrity of Mali. The timing, tasks and modalities for deploying such a force were discussed, including whether it would be necessary to wait for an invitation from the Malian authorities, or for an endorsement by the Security Council, before deployment commenced.

61. Some ECOWAS speakers were of the view that the situation had worsened, including with that day's assault on the interim President, because an ECOWAS force had not yet deployed. In their view, firm measures were required to bring the situation under control both in Bamako and in northern Mali. A force of between 3,000 and 5,000 troops could be deployed, to help to re-establish security but also to train the Malian forces to bring them up to speed.

62. Some participants expressed support for finding ways to deploy the ECOWAS force in Mali even without a request from the authorities. Different cases from the past were recalled, including the intervention of forces of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group in Liberia, and the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia. Some speakers felt that the threat from terrorism in Mali provided legitimacy for a swift intervention. Several participants indicated that the Security Council would have a role to play in any military intervention, while others raised questions on the financing of the force, and wondered what logistics would be required to deploy it.

63. The Foreign Minister of Nigeria pointed out that there were sharp splits in civil society in Mali, including on the question of deploying an ECOWAS force, with those supporting the interim institutions in favour of the force, and Captain Sanogo and his supporters against its deployment.

64. Different strategies for negotiating with the various groups in northern Mali were discussed. While the importance of holding talks with the Mouvement national pour la libération de l'Azawad regarding the return to constitutional order was acknowledged, some Council members expressed concern over the prospect of sitting at the same table with the terrorist groups Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar Eddine. The Foreign Minister of Burkina Faso was of the view that Ansar Eddine would first have to break links with AQIM if it wanted a place at the negotiating table.

65. Various approaches to the crisis in Guinea-Bissau were discussed. The Foreign Minister of Nigeria recalled the provisions set out in the communiqué issued on 4 May 2012 by the ECOWAS Heads of State, whereby the elected speaker of the

National Assembly would assume the interim presidency, and would not stand in the next election. He added that African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) had agreed to this approach, with the exception of the Carlos Gomes Júnior faction.

66. One member of the Security Council expressed the view that the current solution fell short of the objective of combating impunity, since the winner of the last legal election had been sent out of the country while the junta responsible sat at the bargaining table. The same speaker expressed concern that the majority party had been kept out of parliament, which could not commence its work for lack of a quorum.

67. Several speakers referred to the need to strengthen and improve coordination between ECOWAS, the Security Council and other relevant stakeholders, since all were seeking the same goal of a quick return to constitutional order. There was also broad agreement on the need for meaningful security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau, as well as the need to address drug trafficking in that country and in the region as a whole.

IV. Sierra Leone

A. Background and context

68. Prior to the departure of the mission to West Africa, the Security Council received an informal briefing on the political and security situation in Sierra Leone by the United Nations Secretariat.

69. The main objectives of the mission to Sierra Leone were to encourage continued efforts to consolidate peace and national reconciliation; assess the progress achieved by the national authorities and people of Sierra Leone in peacebuilding; and reaffirm the Council's support for the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) and the United Nations country team's contribution to the peacebuilding and development priorities of Sierra Leone.

70. The mission arrived in Sierra Leone on 23 May 2012, following visits to Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. In Freetown, the mission held extensive discussions with the newly arrived Executive Representative of the Secretary-General, senior officials of UNIPSIL and the United Nations country team. The forthcoming elections featured prominently during the Council's meetings with the President, Ernest Bai Koroma, and senior government officials, representatives of political parties, civil society including women's groups, security sector representatives, and members of the National Electoral Commission. The Council received a clear and welcome commitment from the President to a free, fair and transparent electoral process, and the Council encouraged the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNIPSIL to work closely with the Government to ensure that this commitment was adhered to. All political parties and the National Electoral Commission reassured the mission that good progress was being made in preparing for the elections to be held in November 2012.

B. Security Council mission

Meetings with UNIPSIL and the United Nations agencies

71. In accordance with its terms of reference, the mission met with UNIPSIL and the United Nations agencies to discuss the main priority areas for the United Nations in Sierra Leone, namely, supporting the Government's efforts in preparing for the elections; ensuring sustainable development; employment opportunities for the youth; addressing transnational organized crimes, including drug trafficking; as well as planning for the transition from UNIPSIL to a residual United Nations presence.

72. UNIPSIL briefed the mission on the latest political developments in Sierra Leone. The mission was informed that following 11 years of civil war, which ended in 2002, Sierra Leone has made remarkable progress not only towards creating a peaceful and democratic society, but also in initiating successful governance reforms and development strategies.

73. The current political environment in the country is dominated by the upcoming presidential, parliamentary and local council elections, which will be held on 17 November 2012. In the lead-up to the elections, isolated incidents of election-related violence and tension, mainly between supporters of the ruling All People's Congress (APC) and the major opposition party, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), may increase. Political competition between SLPP and APC has also been heightened by the prospects of increased revenues from mining and the potential for exploitation of offshore oil. Notwithstanding the concerns about the potential for political violence during the upcoming elections, there has been increased dialogue involving the two parties, as well as other key stakeholders, over the past several months. However, there is more to be done in fostering dialogue between the presidential aspirants, particularly those from APC and SLPP. The two political parties have also participated in a joint fact-finding mission, set up by the President to investigate and resolve concerns raised by SLPP about the registration of Sierra Leoneans residing in neighbouring countries during the biometric voter registration process. Moreover, on 10 May 2012, the National Electoral Commission and SLPP held their first face-to-face meeting since the 2007 elections to address unresolved concerns raised by SLPP during the last general elections. The meeting was facilitated by UNIPSIL.

74. While the political environment in the country continues to be dominated by the traditional rivalry and mistrust between the two major political parties, the Security Council mission was particularly encouraged by the signing on 18 May 2012 of the Declaration on the 2012 elections by all major national stakeholders, including the 10 registered political parties. When the Council met with the political parties, there was some doubt as to whether SLPP had signed the Declaration. However, at the end of the meeting its representatives confirmed that they had signed the Declaration and would adhere to it. The Declaration sets out the ground rules for the smooth and peaceful conduct of the elections, by clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of each major stakeholder in the electoral process. The mission underlined the need for full implementation of the commitments made by the signatories in the Declaration.

75. There are positive prospects for socioeconomic development in the country, primarily as a result of the exploitation of the country's newly discovered natural

resources, notably minerals such as iron ore. The potentials of the country's agriculture and tourism sectors also need to be harnessed. Despite Sierra Leone's abundant natural resources, unemployment, in particular youth unemployment, remains among the highest in the West African subregion, standing at 60 per cent.

76. The Government issued its response, a white paper, almost two years after the report of the Shears-Moses Commission of Inquiry was presented to President Koroma, and the recommendations have not been fully implemented to date. The implementation of the remaining key recommendations, particularly those relating to actions against those responsible for the violence in 2009, is critical.

77. Efforts of the United Nations on the ground will continue to be led and coordinated by UNIPSIL, which began its operations on 1 October 2008. Pending the successful and acceptable outcome of the elections, as well as the Security Council's decision on the transition of the United Nations presence in Sierra Leone, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1829 (2008) UNIPSIL will continue to implement its mandate to support the Government of Sierra Leone in the areas of conflict prevention and mitigation; fostering political dialogue; and promoting good governance, the rule of law and human rights.

Meeting with the President and Government representatives

78. During the mission's meeting with the President and Government representatives, the President and members of his Cabinet presented the views of the Government on the matters covered by the terms of reference of the mission. The political aim of the Government was to build a peaceful and democratic country, with a vision of full economic and development self-reliance in the long term. To achieve these aims, the President reiterated the Government's commitment to maintain the existing excellent relationship with the United Nations, while emphasizing the need for continued support from the Organization even after the successful holding of elections.

79. Reiterating the Government's primary responsibility for ensuring peaceful elections, the President affirmed that preparations for the elections had reached an advanced stage, with relevant national and local institutions, in particular the National Electoral Commission and the Political Parties Registration Commission, playing a lead role. However, currently lacking a Chair, the Registration Commission may struggle to fill its mandate for the 2012 elections. The voter registration exercise with the newly introduced biometric system was able to ease considerable tension in the country, as it was successfully completed on 25 March 2012, with about 2.7 million people registered. The mission was encouraged by the assurances of the President about his commitment to gender equality, in particular the political participation of women through the allocation of a minimum 30 per cent quota for women in Cabinet positions and the enactment of a gender equality bill by Parliament. As to the country's development strategy, the mission was informed that the Government's current Agenda for Change will evolve into an Agenda for Prosperity, covering the period from 2013 to 2017. The mission was encouraged that the Government had voluntarily opted in to a review by the African Peer Review Mechanism.

80. Regarding the concerns raised about the purchase of weapons worth $4.9 million for use by the armed division of the Sierra Leone police, the Government confirmed that it had transferred, in the presence of international

observers, most of the heavy weapons purchased to the Republic of Sierra Leone armed forces.

81. One of the achievements of post-conflict Sierra Leone is the existence of a free and diverse media. However, stricter adherence to the code of conduct for the media and its enforcement by the Independent Media Commission is required. The Sierra Leone Broadcasting Corporation, which was inaugurated jointly by the United Nations Secretary-General and President Koroma in June 2010, will have an important role to play during the elections by providing equitable access to all political parties despite its internal administrative and financial difficulties.

Meeting with security institutions (Office of National Security, Republic of Sierra Leone armed forces and Sierra Leone police)

82. The mission was briefed by the security institutions. In order to consolidate the gains that have been made in strengthening democracy and fostering peace and development, the security sector must adequately plan and prepare for the upcoming elections. There are indications that security threats are likely to be as challenging leading up to and after the 2012 elections as they were for the 2007 elections. In response, the security sector has developed an integrated strategy to provide the framework for cooperation and effective resource management for the elections. The National Security Council Coordinating Group is the central security coordinating mechanism for the 2012 elections, which brings together all the country's security structures.

83. The mission noted in particular the critical role of the Sierra Leone police in providing security during the electoral period. The mission underlined the need for the police to remain independent and impartial and operate in line with principles of democratic governance and accountability towards human rights and the rule of law. The mission drew attention to the responsibilities of Sierra Leone's security agencies to respond proportionately to threats to the security of all citizens without resorting to lethal force, and encouraged the early establishment of the independent police complaints board. With support from UNIPSIL, 10,500 personnel of various security institutions were given election-specific training, including in public order management.

84. The mission was encouraged by Sierra Leone's participation in international peace operations. The Sierra Leone police have deployed over 260 peacekeepers to United Nations peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Somalia and the Sudan. The Sierra Leone Government also informed the mission about the ongoing deployment to the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the forthcoming deployment of elements of their armed forces as peacekeepers to AMISOM. Despite these efforts, challenges remain, including inadequate resources to meet the management and operational needs of the security forces.

Meeting with political parties

85. The mission met with political parties. The parties expressed their willingness to work towards ensuring a free, fair and transparent electoral process. The Council commended the political parties on the signing of the Declaration on the 2012 elections in which the parties, together with electoral management bodies, the Government, traditional leaders, media, women and youth groups, the Human Rights Commission, the Independent Media Commission, the National Commission

for Democracy and other national stakeholders committed themselves to political tolerance and to work together for the common good. The Declaration also outlines the specific responsibilities and obligations of the signatories. The commitments to peaceful elections and increased participation of women were positive.

Meeting with the National Electoral Commission, the Independent Media Commission, the Political Parties Registration Commission and the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Corporation

86. The mission was briefed by the National Electoral Commission, the Independent Media Commission, the Political Parties Registration Commission and the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Corporation. The National Electoral Commission informed the mission that the election process is on track despite the tense political atmosphere among the political parties. The mission was informed that on 5 May 2012 Parliament approved the Public Elections Law, which is aimed at addressing gaps and inconsistencies in existing legislation and will consolidate all electoral legislation into a single text. It also contains provisions granting the Commission the power to nullify votes and provides that if the nullification affects the outcome of an election that there will be a rerun. The mission was also advised that the Constitution of Sierra Leone provides for the creation of the Electoral Offences Courts. In terms of electoral timelines, the exhibition of the provisional voter register is planned from 30 June to 4 July 2012 and the final voter register is expected to be printed and gazetted from 21 August to 6 September 2012. The Electoral Commission and the other election management bodies meeting the mission stated that the assistance received from the United Nations, the international community and the Government in preparation for the elections was appreciated.

Meeting with members of civil society, including women's groups

87. The United Kingdom High Commissioner hosted a lunch for the Council at his residence. Attending the lunch were representatives of civil society — National Election Watch, the Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone and AdvocAid — as well as the diplomatic community, including a representative of the International Military Assistance Training Team.

88. Also attending the lunch were representatives of the following women's groups: Mano River Women Peace Network, National Organisation for Women, African Kind Hearts, Campaign for Good Governance, Women's Solidarity Support Group and Women in the Security Sector. During the lunch these representatives made a presentation to Council members. They discussed their ideas about peacebuilding and reconciliation, including the question of reparations for war victims. All speakers stressed the important role of women in providing early warning for potential conflict and spoke in favour of greater representation of women in parliament. The women representatives highlighted the progress being made and the remaining challenges to the advancement of women, including in promoting their political participation in the forthcoming elections.

Wrap-up meeting with the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General

89. The final session was a wrap-up meeting with the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNIPSIL, Jens Toyberg-Frandzen. The Council encouraged the Executive Representative to report to the Council any increases in

tension or major developments, particularly in the light of the forthcoming elections, so that there were no major surprises. The Council also encouraged the Executive Representative to use his good offices to ensure that the commitments the President and his Government made to the Security Council mission would be fully implemented.

C. Conclusions and recommendations

90. It is the mission's view that the country has made significant progress in post-conflict reconstruction, peace consolidation and peacebuilding efforts. The mission commends the Government for the progress made and for its positive steps in consolidating peace and in promoting a comprehensive development agenda. As the political situation in the country is dominated by preparations for the presidential, parliamentary and local council elections, which are scheduled for 17 November 2012, the Government should continue its efforts to ensure free, fair and peaceful elections in 2012 and engage in dialogue with all stakeholders.

91. Sierra Leone is on the path to building a lasting peace. However, every effort must be made to continue addressing a number of remaining challenges, including (a) encouraging national reconciliation and promoting broad and inclusive internal political dialogue; (b) strengthening national public institutions; (c) ensuring the neutrality of the security sector institutions; (d) promoting national unity and cohesion through the media; (e) managing natural resources while redressing social and economic inequities; (f) creating economic opportunities to address high youth unemployment; and (g) mobilizing internal and external resources, from bilateral and multilateral sources, to promote social and economic development. The mission urges continued international support for the successful accomplishment of these goals.

92. The mission recommends:

(a) The Government should continue its efforts to strengthen a culture of good governance, democracy and respect for the rule of law and human rights, including through institutional capacity-building, with the support of international partners;

(b) The Government should respond to the remaining key recommendations in the report of the Shears-Moses Commission of Inquiry, in particular those relating to actions against those responsible for the violence in 2009, while ensuring continued prosecution of all persons responsible for political violence, provide a level playing field for all political contestants and guarantee the independence of democratic and State institutions. The Government should also respond to the Kelvin Lewis report into the violence in Bo in September 2011;

(c) The National Electoral Commission should continue to strengthen its technical expertise to ensure that the elections are credible. The Commission should also continue to work closely with all stakeholders and address any electoral concerns through dialogue. In this regard, the Political Parties Registration Commission, in accordance with its mandate, should play a lead role in convening regular meetings with the political parties to ensure ongoing dialogue about electoral issues and the Government should ensure that a new Chair is swiftly found for this organization;

(d) All political parties are encouraged to take ownership of the electoral process, continue constructive engagement and dialogue, refrain from political violence and intolerance and increase the participation of women in politics. Candidates should collectively take a public lead against political intimidation or violence;

(e) The security sector should remain independent, professional and adequately equipped to enable it to transparently, proportionately and effectively carry out its functions within the rule of law;

(f) The Independent Media Commission should proactively monitor the media and ensure compliance with the code of conduct for the media;

(g) The national authorities should, with international support and assistance, urgently address the administrative and financial challenges facing the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Corporation;

(h) The Government should continue to implement its commitment to promoting gender equality and the advancement of women, including through the allocation of a minimum 30 per cent quota for women in Cabinet and other senior Government positions;

(i) Development partners and the donor community, including the Bretton Woods institutions, should respond generously to the positive steps taken by the Government by providing both financial resources and technical assistance to assist the country in achieving its short-, medium- and long-term development goals;

(j) The Economic Community of West African States and the Mano River Union should, working closely with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, intensify efforts to consolidate regional peace and security, including through tackling the challenges posed by drug trafficking and transnational organized crime, proliferation of small arms and other security threats in the subregion;

(k) The Government should maintain and strengthen the existing excellent working relationship with UNIPSIL and the United Nations country team to ensure the effective implementation of the UNIPSIL mandate.

93. As the Council will remain actively seized of the matter, it encourages UNIPSIL to continue to report, through the Secretary-General, on the situation in Sierra Leone, including on the country's progress in preparing for the 2012 elections, promoting national dialogue and supporting key national institutions in the consolidation of peace and democratic governance. The mission commends the United Nations integrated approach, which has been successfully implemented in the country for over 10 years, and encourages UNIPSIL and the United Nations country team to continue to work closely together in an integrated manner, particularly as plans are being made for the transition of the United Nations presence.

94. The Council encourages the Sierra Leone configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission to work closely with the new Executive Representative of the Secretary-General to engage with the Government at a senior level to support progress on critical peacebuilding tasks, such as political dialogue and reconciliation.

95. The mission would like to record its deep appreciation for the efforts of the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General for Sierra Leone, Jens Anders Toyberg-Frandzen, as well as the staff of UNIPSIL and United Nations agencies in the country who have been working in support of peace and development in Sierra Leone. It would also like to thank all the members of the Secretariat who accompanied the mission for their vital role in ensuring its success.

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Letter dated 3 April 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I refer to Security Council resolution 2142 (2014), by which the Council requested me to provide options and recommendations by 4 April 2014 on United Nations (including the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia) and other technical assistance to the Federal Government of Somalia in complying with the Council's requirements in paragraphs 3 to 7 and its requests in paragraph 9 of that resolution, and to assist the Government in improving its capacities to manage weapons and military equipment, including in monitoring and verification.

In line with this request, an assessment team was deployed to Mogadishu and Nairobi from 12 to 18 March 2014. The team was led by the Department of Political Affairs and comprised experts from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the United Nations Mine Action Service, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea.

The assessment team began with meetings in New York with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Somalia and the National Security Adviser to the President, in his capacity as coordinator for arms and ammunition management. In Mogadishu, the assessment team conducted a one-day consultation with the National Security Adviser, the Chief of the Defence Force, representatives of the police and the Custodial Corps, and the Ministries of Defence and National Intelligence and Security to identify capacity constraints and remedial options. During this consultation, the Secretariat also facilitated a meeting between the Coordinator of the Monitoring Group and a representative of the Office of the National Security Adviser to discuss the last assessment of the Monitoring Group regarding the partial lifting of the arms embargo, submitted pursuant to paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013). The assessment team also met with the Force Commander of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the representative of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia, as well as representatives of the Governments of France, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, the European Union, the European Union Training Mission in Somalia and a strategic review team for that Mission from Brussels.

Key findings

Throughout its encounters with the Federal Government of Somalia, the assessment team heard expressions of strong commitment to comply with the sanctions regime and the reporting requirements articulated in resolution 2142 (2014)

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and in previous resolutions, in particular resolutions 2111 (2013) and 2093 (2013). The Government understands that it has to demonstrate not only the will to comply with the relevant resolutions, but also to show real tangible progress in the coming weeks and months in complying with the terms of the partial lifting of the arms embargo. However, it was clear that the Government faces serious capacity challenges and multiple competing priorities. The Office of the National Security Adviser, which coordinates the Government's reporting obligations to the Security Council and oversees the national architecture for weapons and ammunition management, is already stretched beyond its limits. During its one-day consultation with the Government, the assessment team provided an initial briefing on the Government's obligations arising from resolution 2142 (2014). A more sustained approach to capacity-building will however be required to ensure that the Government, as well as the Member States that are supplying weapons or military equipment or providing assistance and training to the Government, comply with Security Council requirements.

The political and security environment presents a considerable challenge to the Government's effort to meet its reporting obligations and effectively manage weapons and ammunition stockpiles. The renewed offensive by Somali security forces and AMISOM will further complicate efforts to accelerate security sector reforms, including efforts to develop the structure and professionalism of the security forces and integrate allied militias. As an expanded AMISOM and the Somali National Army pursue a renewed offensive against Al-Shabaab in line with Security Council resolution 2124 (2013), monitoring and verifying the flow of weapons is likely to become more challenging for the Government, but not impossible.

In recent months, the Government and its international partners have made some initial progress in establishing an institutional framework for overseeing weapons and ammunition management that is in line with national development priorities under the Somali Compact. Institutions have been established that should drive oversight of weapons and ammunition management issues and coordinate support to the security sector from international partners. These institutions and the National Security Adviser, who chairs them, have the confidence and support of the United Nations and bilateral and multilateral actors.

The Somali Explosives Management Authority, established by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in August 2013, is the national body for ammunition, explosives and weapons management. On 22 January 2014, the Government established an Arms and Ammunition Management Steering Committee as a high-level body to coordinate and monitor the implementation by the Federal Government of activities related to arms control and stockpile management, import, export and transit of weapons, tracking of weapons, public awareness-raising and legislative development. The Steering Committee membership reflects the Government's national security institutions and is supported by some Member States and regional organizations that provide support to the security sector. The Steering Committee is chaired by the National Security Adviser and is composed of representatives of the Federal Government security sector,[1] UNSOM, the Mine Action

[1] Ministries of National Security and Defence, Somali National Army, Somali Police Force, National Intelligence and Security Agency and Custodial Corps.

Service, AMISOM, the European Union, bilateral partners[2] and non-governmental implementing partners.[3]

A multi-stakeholder Weapons and Ammunition Management Technical Working Group[4] supports the Steering Committee in the implementation of its mandate. The Working Group's work plan for 2014 includes supporting compliance with resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2142 (2014), establishing an arms registration system, constructing armouries and ammunition storage facilities and holding a government-wide workshop on arms and ammunition management responsibilities. On 21 January 2014, the workshop was hosted in partnership with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), UNSOM, the Mine Action Service and UNDP. Its findings and recommendations will be published by UNIDIR in April 2014.

Some new infrastructure has also been built and old infrastructure revived to manage and store weapons, but existing donor programmes will need to be accelerated and enhanced. Immediate interim measures to address gaps can and should be achieved by October 2014.

Notifications and reporting

Since the partial lifting of the arms embargo, four notifications have been submitted by the Government for the Committee's attention, but all have lacked sufficient details. The assessment team noted that the Government has received little direct assistance in drafting and submitting these notifications, and recognized its limited capacity to adequately respond to the requirements. The assessment team also noted that quality of information provided by Member States that supply weapons and military equipment has a bearing on the Government's ability to appropriately notify the Committee.

The Government faces considerable challenges in accurately reporting on the structure, strength and composition of its forces, not least because of the coordination challenges inherent in a nascent and fragmented security sector supported by multiple bilateral partners. The core Somali National Army and police contingents are often supplemented by localized allied militias. To develop an accurate picture of the security sector, the Government needs to amalgamate a number of separate data systems, including from different registration processes in different sectors, payroll databases and human resources lists, to develop a coherent centralized system that reflects the extent of the security forces.

The assessment team emphasized to the Government the importance of accurately reflecting the current status of the security forces in future reporting rather than its aspirational goals, and the urgent requirement for the Government to clarify the number of armouries and ammunition storage facilities in use. In this regard, ongoing assistance will be required to develop a reliable reporting baseline

[2] United Kingdom, United States, Turkey.

[3] Mines Advisory Group, Danish Demining Group and Bancroft Global Development.

[4] The Technical Working Group is co-chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Security and the United Nations Mine Action Service. The composition mirrors that of the Steering Committee, and also includes the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, Norwegian People's Aid and the Fondation suisse de déminage.

of the security structure, including allied militias, as well as the status and number of Government facilities and procedures and codes of conduct.

Weapons and ammunition management

The Government has a plan to implement a much-needed national weapons registration system, to further develop its network of armouries and ammunition storage facilities and start revising the legislative framework of Somalia despite its significant challenges in managing weapons and ammunition stocks. With technical support from the Mine Action Service, the Somali National Army, the police and the National Intelligence and Security Agency have received training in armoury record-keeping. Training in weapons marking as well as arms and ammunition disposal and quality assurance is planned to commence in May 2014.

Some progress has been made towards developing infrastructure required to safely store weapons and ammunition. As of March 2014, the Mine Action Service and its implementing partners have rehabilitated or constructed a total of 10 armouries,[5] ranging from relatively small police storage facilities to larger purpose-built constructions for the Somali National Army and the Somali police forces. These armouries are designed to store small arms and light weapons as well as small-calibre ammunition only. They are not built to accommodate explosive light weapons ammunition. Some of the armouries have not yet been commissioned, but are scheduled to become operational in the near future and do not contain any weapons.

A purpose-built storage facility at Halane now serves as the main processing point for marking, recording and distributing imported weapons and ammunition, with weapons marking starting in April 2014. The Weapons and Ammunition Management Technical Working Group has identified 18 armouries (capable of holding 27,700 weapons) and 12 ammunition depots (capable of holding up to 12.1 million rounds of ammunition), in Mogadishu and the regions, that need to be constructed for the national army, police and corrections forces. Construction work has commenced, with the support of the Mine Action Service, but the anticipated timeframe for completing these construction projects is beyond 2014. The assessment team noted that procedures for receiving, verifying, recording and reporting weapons at the point of entry require urgent and sustained capacity-building assistance. Immediate assistance is also required to implement procedures for the safe transportation and delivery of weapons and ammunition, including interim options to secure weapons where operations are happening. As a matter of priority, the Government should quickly identify the government entity responsible for importing weapons and ammunition.

The Government's plans for enhancing weapons and ammunition management have considerable support from the international community, including the United Nations, but implementation timeframes need to be accelerated to strengthen the Government's control over weapons and ammunition. The Arms and Ammunition Management Steering Committee and its working group would benefit from a surge

[5] Comprising Somali National Army armouries in Mogadishu at Halane, Villa Gashandiga, Villa Baidoa and Jazeera Camp; National Intelligence and Security Agency headquarters armoury in Mogadishu; and Somali police force headquarters armoury in Mogadishu and armouries at Baidoa and Beledweyne police stations (two at each location).

in international and national capacity as well as a long-term capacity-building programme.

Urgent funding and equipment is required to speed up the implementation of storage facility construction projects as well as the marking and registration capacity in Mogadishu and the regions.

Immediate technical capacity is also required to enable the Government to centrally authorize, notify, receive, verify, report and record imports of arms, ammunition and military equipment for use by its security services. In the long term a multi-partner support programme will be required to raise standards and procedures at seaports, counter arms trafficking and develop a robust legislative framework for governing the possession and use of firearms by State security services.

Monitoring and verification

An international monitoring mechanism on compliance with the sanctions regime, including the partial lifting of the arms embargo, already exists. The Monitoring Group, which is based in Nairobi, currently analyses notifications and deliveries of weapons into Somalia and gathers further information on their management. The Monitoring Group has limited capacity to fully implement this aspect of its mandate, however, especially to physically verify all deliveries and movements of weapons. In addition, the security situation in Somalia currently prevents the Monitoring Group, which operates under the same security restrictions as the rest of the United Nations system, from moving freely throughout the country. There is currently no other mechanism to independently verify weapons and ammunition stocks, and the Government's capacity to monitor and verify its own weapons management systems needs to be reinforced.

Options for enhancing reporting and weapons management

Given the imperative to meet the urgent needs of the Government and the reporting requirements of the Security Council, and in the light of the restrictive security environment, there are a limited number of options for and actors capable of providing technical assistance to the Government. However, with some creative thinking and the commitment of the Government and the international community, a number of gaps can be addressed that would enhance the Government's accountability for arms and ammunition, and increase transparency on the structure, composition and status of the security sector.

Training and technical support can quickly strengthen the Government's capacity to fulfil its responsibility to notify the Committee as required by paragraph 3 of resolution 2142 (2014). The United Nations can provide additional training programmes on notification and reporting, and develop a suite of reporting templates for notifying the Committee. Outreach to the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations and other Member States that supply weapons and military equipment to the Federal Government of Somalia would help to enhance the quality of information provided to the Government. All of these options are considered feasible and can be immediately implemented by the United Nations Secretariat and UNSOM. To support the Government in managing the flow of weapons and ammunition, Member States should ensure that all notifications and deliveries are coordinated by the Office of the National Security Adviser.

Reporting on the structure and composition of the security forces, infrastructure and weapons management codes of conduct and procedures needs to be enhanced with the support of the Weapons and Ammunition Management Technical Working Group. The United Nations can continue to support the Technical Working Group to ensure that international support is coordinated and sequenced appropriately in line with resolutions 2093 (2013), 2111 (2013) and 2124 (2013). A more rigorous process of consultation, and feedback to the Government from the Monitoring Group,[6] could further enable the Government to address information gaps in its reporting and define requirements for future reports in line with resolution 2142 (2014).

Monitoring and verification of weapons and ammunition flows presents a significant challenge in Somalia. Other arms embargo monitoring and inspection mechanisms, such as the Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire and the work that the United Nations Mission in Liberia does in inspecting weapons that have been notified to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia, would be very difficult to apply in Somalia. While these may be appropriate for Chapter VII peacekeeping operations, they do not work in the context of a small special political mission. Enhancing the capacity of the Monitoring Group to physically verify all deliveries and movement of weapons would still be subject to the same security constraints that other United Nations entities face, which currently limit its access to the protected zone inside Mogadishu International Airport and some regional areas.

In view of the above, a joint verification team composed of Somali and international verification experts was considered a viable option. Such a verification mechanism would meet three important conditions:

(a) The international verification experts on the team, who should be able to travel throughout Somalia, would provide the independence and objectivity to promote confidence in the Security Council that weapons are not being resold or transferred to individuals or entities that are not in the service of the security forces of the Federal Government of Somalia;

(b) The Somali counterparts on such a team would ensure access to the inspection sites, and the required commitment from the Government for the verification visits to work and for deficiencies to be remedied;

(c) The team would also contribute to building national capacity to undertake this important task, which will be required in the long run.

The joint verification team would be established under the authority of the Arms and Ammunition Management Steering Committee and would be tasked by its Technical Working Group to undertake verification assessments, and report its findings and recommendations. The Technical Working Group would also be the appropriate forum to endorse and support corrective actions required to address any non-compliance in the management of arms and ammunition. Since the Monitoring Group is also represented in the Weapons and Ammunition Management Technical Working Group, it would receive first-hand inspection reports and could provide feedback to the joint verification team. The Monitoring Group could also raise any

[6] As requested by the Council in paragraph 12 of resolution 2142 (2014).

issues that it has identified regarding the management of arms and ammunition, in line with paragraph 13 (k) of resolution 2060 (2012) and paragraph 12 of resolution 2142 (2014).

Recommendations for United Nations and other international assistance

Immediate international assistance is required to enhance the technical, human and administrative capacity of the Office of the National Security Adviser to the President to enable it to better coordinate inter-agency inputs to the notification and reporting obligations of the Federal Government of Somalia. Owing to the technical nature of these reporting requirements and the immediacy with which assistance must be provided, it would be most effective coming from Member States. In line with their existing mandates, UNSOM and the Mine Action Service can support the Government in gathering necessary data, including by coordinating with major training partners of Somalia, including AMISOM, the European Union Training Mission and other bilateral partners, and providing coordination support and training.

With this enhanced capacity, the Office of the National Security Adviser should:

(a) Update its recent reporting to the Security Council on the structure of the Somalia security forces and address the gaps identified by the Monitoring Group and the new requirements of resolution 2142 (2014);

(b) Commence a baseline registration survey of the security sector, building on the work of the Somali forces registration and payment project being implemented by the Mine Action Service and starting with the Somali National Army. UNSOM should provide technical assistance to the Office of the National Security Adviser to coordinate this project with relevant actors;

(c) Start a phased weapons and ammunition baseline survey, through a weapons marking and registration process, against which future verification activities should be conducted.

It is important that the Federal Government of Somalia and its partners build on the early work of the Arms and Ammunition Management Steering Committee and its Technical Working Group, and accelerate priority activities in the 2014 work plan, especially outside of Mogadishu. The United Nations will continue to provide coordination and training support within the framework of the Steering Committee and the Technical Working Group. I urge contributing Member States to provide the necessary financing and in-kind resources as soon as possible to accelerate key deliverables. The explosive remnants of war from ammunition and explosive storage sites in Dayniile, Afgooye, Baidoa and Beledweyne need to be urgently cleared, for example. These sites are currently a source of material for improvised explosive devices and pose a strategic threat to the Government and international partners in Somalia. Once clear, the Dayniile site, which is 30 km outside of Mogadishu, will be transformed into the Government's main weapons and ammunition storage facility. The current Mine Action Service plan to clear these sites will take from three to five years to implement, subject to the availability of funding.

Critical gaps identified by the assessment team for the management of arms and ammunition should be addressed on a priority basis. There is an urgent requirement for five additional marking machines to ensure that weapons imported in the future are marked and registered in line with international standards. To mark weapons in the sectors/regions, vehicles, generators and weapons cutting machines

are required for mobile marking units that would deploy to Government armouries outside of Mogadishu. Interim measures are also required to store weapons in the regions, including containers, rifle racks and basic security measures. The United Nations will continue to support the coordination and training of this assistance through UNSOM and the Mine Action Service, respectively. I call on Member States to contribute outstanding equipment and resources as outlined above.

The Arms and Ammunition Management Steering Committee of the Federal Government of Somalia should consider establishing a small joint verification team, composed of Somali and international verification experts, to physically verify arms and ammunition provided to the Government and the systems of control for their management. The verification would require technical on-site inspection and the verification team would seek to make recommendations to immediately rectify any problems that may exist. This process should be methodical and should be based on the principles of an audit process. Member States working in Somalia with in-depth experience in joint verification mechanisms, and the monitoring of arms and ammunition, should help the Steering Committee to develop the concept for such a verification mechanism, and assist in training the joint verification team. Donors, including those currently represented on the Steering Committee and the Technical Working Group, could support the verification team.

The Monitoring Group should increase its presence in Mogadishu and step up its interaction with the Government, specifically the Office of the National Security Adviser. The Monitoring Group should participate regularly in the meetings of the Weapons and Ammunition Management Technical Working Group in line with its mandate, including future verification activities where security conditions permit. It should also continue to provide its independent assessment on whether the Government and other actors are meeting the overall objectives of the arms embargo, identify trends and cause of violations where they exist, and report to the Security Council providing recommendations for the sanctioning of individuals, States or entities that violate the arms embargo. In order to enhance its presence in Mogadishu, consideration should be given to augmenting the capacity of the Monitoring Group within its current configuration.

Observations

I wish to express my deep appreciation to the Federal Government of Somalia for the strong collaboration and partnership that has characterized this assessment and to the Member States and international organizations for their support to my assessment team.

Somalia needs to show tangible progress between now and October 2014, when the Council will review the partial lifting of the arms embargo against the Federal Government of Somalia. It is also important, however, that we set realistic expectations for what can be achieved by the Government in this timeframe. State-building in conflict situations is particularly challenging. Many of the recommendations set out above are components of the broader effort required to meet the major, long-term restructuring needs for the Somali security sector, which would be hard to implement under the best of circumstances. It will be difficult, for example, to expect a fully professional system of control for arms and ammunition to be established without the barracks to institutionalize a professional Somali national army. At the very least, baselines for the Somali security forces and

weapons and ammunition should be established and verified, and future progress should be measured against them. A number of political challenges must also be overcome to enable the Government to fully account for its security forces, including in the context of negotiations on a federal state structure.

I call on the Government to ensure that the urgent gaps identified by this assessment are filled. I am encouraged by its commitment to deliver on the requirements that I have presented above, including its receptivity to the joint verification of arms and ammunition. The sustained support of the international community will be required to meet these priorities and to transform the security services of Somalia after decades of division and mismanagement. The focus of the Government and the international community must now shift rapidly from identifying priority objectives to delivering on priority tasks.

I am grateful for the early strong indications of support from the international community for these recommendations. The additional human resources and technical assistance from the United Nations and other international partners requested above will provide much-needed capacity and could boost confidence in the short term. Where possible, I encourage partners to take a long-term view of their support and ensure that their assistance builds the capacity of Somali counterparts. No less critical will be a coherent international approach to help the Government to meet its reporting obligations and ensure that resources are used effectively and efficiently. In this context, UNSOM will support coordination efforts by the Government in line with paragraph 22 of resolution 2093 (2013).

I have previously assured the Council and the Federal Government of Somalia of my personal commitment to peace and stability in Somalia. We must do all that we can to create an enabling environment for the Government to succeed. It is imperative that the Government demonstrates its commitment to transparent and responsible management of its security forces. Time is of the essence. I encourage the Federal Government of Somalia to take forward my recommendations.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Letter dated 2 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a report on the torture and summary execution of persons incarcerated by the Syrian regime (see annex). This report, which was made public in January 2014, was prepared by a commission of inquiry consisting of legal, medical and medical imaging experts, chaired by Sir Desmond de Silva, former Chief Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

The work carried out by this team was based on the photographs provided by a former member of the Syrian military police, who had defected, and was codenamed "Caesar". He had been tasked, from the start of the Syrian conflict, with photographing the bodies of detainees who had died in the regime's prisons, and on whom various abuses, leading to their deaths, had been inflicted.

The authenticity of the photographic images obtained from "Caesar" has been confirmed through in-depth expert analysis. These horrific photos suggest that some 11,000 Syrians have been tortured and executed in the regime's prisons since the start of the conflict.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and the annexed report circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Gérard **Araud**

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Annex to the letter dated 2 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]

A report into the credibility of certain evidence with regard to torture and execution of persons incarcerated by the current Syrian regime

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I. The Members of the Inquiry Team

The Legal Team

The Right Honourable Sir Desmond de Silva QC (Chairman)

A former Chief Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Appointed personally by the Secretary General of the United Nations. In that capacity he brought about the arrest of President Charles Taylor of Liberia.

Professor Sir Geoffrey Nice QC

The former lead prosecutor of ex-President Milosevic of Yugoslavia before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

Professor David M. Crane

The first Chief Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Appointed personally by the Secretary General of the United Nations. In that capacity he indicted President Charles Taylor of Liberia.

The Forensics Team

Dr. Stuart J. Hamilton, MB, ChB, BMSc (Hons), FRCPath, MFFLM
A forensic pathologist on the United Kingdom Home Office Register

Professor Susan Black, OBE, BSc, PhD, DSc, FRSE, FRAI Cert-FAI
Professor of Anatomy and Forensic Anthropology. Certified forensic anthropologist

Stephen Cole, MFSSoc
Technical Director for Acume Forensics and Forensic Imaging Expert

II. Executive Summary

The members of this inquiry team have, collectively, vast experience in the prosecution of war crimes, crimes against humanity and other crimes contrary to international law.

The inquiry team was mandated to determine the credibility of a defector from Syria whose occupation prior to his defection was in the service of the military police of the Syrian government. In that capacity, for many years, he had been in the military police and in that role it fell to him to photograph scenes of crimes. With the onset of the civil war the nature of his occupation changed. His duties, and those of his colleagues, now were to photograph and document the bodies of those brought from their places of detention to a military hospital.

The bodies he photographed since the civil war began, showed signs of starvation, brutal beatings, strangulation, and other forms of torture and killing.

The defector who was codenamed "Caesar" by the inquiry team had, during the course of his work, smuggled out some tens of thousands of images of corpses so photographed by his colleagues and himself. Other similar images have been smuggled out by other people. In all, approximately fifty-five thousand (55,000)

images have, to date, been made available outside Syria by these processes. As there were some four or five photographs taken of each body this approximates to there being images of about eleven thousand (11,000) dead detainees.

Having carefully interviewed "Caesar" and evaluated his evidence in light of the exhibits available to it, the inquiry team found him, for its part, to be a truthful and credible witness. He revealed no signs of being "sensational"; nor did he seem partisan. Although he was a supporter of those who opposed the present regime, the inquiry team is satisfied that he gave an honest account of his experiences. If he wished to exaggerate his evidence it would have been very easy for him to say that he had actually witnessed executions. In fact , he made it quite plain that he never witnessed a single execution. There were many other reasons which drove the inquiry team to its conclusion that his evidence was reliable and could safely be acted upon in any subsequent judicial proceedings.

III. Introduction

The members of the inquiry team travelled to the Middle East from the United Kingdom and the United States of America to discharge a mandate given to them by the firm of Carter-Ruck and Co. in the City of London.

The information available to the legal team prior to its arrival in the Middle East was that there was a defector from Syria who was then in a third country. Prior to his defection he had been in the military police. The legal team was further informed that there were some fifty-five thousand (55,000) photographic images of some eleven thousand (11,000) detained persons who had been tortured and killed by agents of the current Syrian regime since the beginning of the uprising against the Assad regime in March 2011.

It was also the understanding of the inquiry team that this defector had supplied thousands of photographic images of executed persons by making copies of the photographic images on a "flash drive" (memory stick).

The mandate entrusted to the inquiry team was to question this defector and to establish whether he was a truthful and credible witness.

The interviewing of the defector, who was codenamed "Caesar" for his own protection, took place on the 12, 13, and 18 January 2014.

During the course of his account to the inquiry team the witness dealt with his employment in the military police and informed the members of the team that it fell to that section to take photographs of persons who were injured or dead. However after the uprising against the Assad regime it became routine to take photographs of people in detention who had been tortured and killed during detention. The reason for photographing executed persons was twofold: First to permit a death certificate to be produced without families requiring to see the body thereby avoiding the authorities having to give a truthful account of their deaths; second to confirm that orders to execute individuals had been carried out. At no stage did "Caesar" indicate to members of the inquiry team that he had been present when any torture or any execution had taken place.

IV. Methodology of Inquiry

Legal methodology

Given the competing national and other interests in the Syrian conflict the members of the inquiry team approached their task in the evaluation of the evidence of the defector codenamed "Caesar" and the photographic images with caution and an alertness to the fact that the inquiry team itself had to guard against being used as a vehicle for others to advance a particular point of view.

In addition, in view of the fact that this inquiry was evaluating potential evidence which, if true, revealed the gravest of crimes contrary to international law, the members of the inquiry team subjected all evidence heard and viewed to rigorous scrutiny. Given the nature of the allegations made, the inquiry team proceeded on the basis of only coming to an adverse conclusion as regards criminal involvement on the most convincing account.

In this regard the inquiry team was most ably assisted by three highly experienced forensic experts for whose professionalism the legal team is most grateful.

Forensic Methodology

The digital images of dead bodies were examined by Dr. Stuart Hamilton and Professor Sue Black. The images were examined in the first instance without the experts being aware of the evidence of "Caesar" or having any written account of his evidence. The images were assessed for evidence of physical injury and other relevant features. It was recognized that the images were said to have been produced during a time of armed conflict in Syria and the experts were therefore mindful of the possibility of apparent injuries being the result of lawful military action.

Thirty-five images were uploaded directly to a secure server at Acume Forensics in the United Kingdom for assessment by Stephen Cole, an expert in digital imaging. It was confirmed to the inquiry team that these images were not digitally altered.

Of the fifty-five thousand (55,000) images twenty-six thousand nine hundred and forty eight (26,948) images were present in various folders on the computer where the images were examined. The inquiry team was satisfied that all of those twenty-six thousand nine hundred and forty eight (26,948) were provided by "Caesar", as were some of the other twenty thousand plus images.[1]

A very significant percentage of the bodies showed emaciation as defined here:

Emaciation: For an individual to be classified as emaciated (medically referred to as cachexia), there should be marked evidence of severely low body weight with features such as scaphoid abdomen (sunken with prominent hip bones), prominent ribs, wasting of the limb muscles and in some cases, Hippocratic facies (a

[1] The inquiry team was given access to the images referred to in this paragraph by the current holders of these images namely the Syrian National Movement.

sunken and hollow facial appearance). An individual merely appearing "thin" was insufficient to place him into this category.

The following terminology was used for particular categories of images:

Convincing Evidence of Inflicted Trauma: For images in this category, there was evidence of physical injury of the sort that would result from beating, binding, restraint or other physical assault but excluding injuries that could reasonably have occurred as the result of legal combat engagement. This category was reserved for those injuries that the experts felt could be so presented with a high degree of certainty to a court.

There were many bodies that showed bloodstaining. The presence of such staining alone in the absence of visible injury on the image was not considered to be evidence of injury; it was necessary for there to be an associated lesion that would cause bleeding.

Equivocal Evidence of Inflicted Trauma: For these images, there was either evidence of injury that was partially obscured or the images did not capture injuries with sufficient clarity to support a high degree of scientific certainty as to cause. Therefore these cases represent individuals where there was a possibility, but not the "convincing evidence" of inflicted trauma as defined above.

No apparent trauma: These images did not show sufficient evidence to be categorized within either of the two groups above. This does not mean that the individual had not sustained inflicted unlawful trauma, simply that this could not be confirmed from the evidence available.

The experts took the view that they were examining physical findings only. They could not determine from the physical appearances whether torture had in fact taken place, as torture requires a state of mind in the individual or individuals inflicting the injuries.

Limitations of the forensic analysis of the images. There were certain limitations upon the forensic experts' assessment of the images:

The images were not produced in the manner of evidentiary photographs as would be taken by crime scene investigators in cases of domestic homicide but were said to have been produced as a record of the deceased individuals. Therefore the images did not bear a scale and there were no close-up images of individual injuries. The majority of the images did not show the back of the body of the deceased and therefore any injuries that may have been present at the back of the body could not be assessed.

The images were only of the external aspect of the bodies and so internal injuries or internal natural disease could not be identified.

Given the time constraints upon the inquiry team and the large number of images available it was not possible to produce a detailed report regarding the exact injuries present in each image for each individual. Therefore the above categorization was adopted.

V. The Evidence of "Caesar"

This witness who defected from Syria and who had been working for the Syrian government was given the codename "Caesar" by the inquiry team to protect the witness and members of his family.

The inquiry team had the witness look at two Syrian identification cards which carried his name on them along with his photograph and occupation.

"Caesar" told the inquiry team that he had worked in the military police for some 13 years prior to his defection. Originally his job had involved the taking of photographs related to ordinary criminal matters and sending them to "*the judiciary*".[2] In short, he was a scenes of crime investigator.

Since the civil war against the current regime began, his job changed from taking photographs of crime scenes and accidents to "*taking pictures of killed detainees*". The inquiry team was informed by "Caesar" that for the last three years his only job together with others in his section, was to photograph and document bodies of detainees who had been killed. Caesar went on to tell the inquiry team that his job was difficult and caused his colleagues and himself "*psychological suffering*".

The procedure was that when detainees were killed at their places of detention their bodies would be taken to a military hospital to which he would be sent with a doctor and a member of the judiciary, "Caesar's" function being to photograph the corpses. He informed the inquiry team that there could be as many as fifty (50) bodies a day to photograph which required fifteen to thirty minutes of work per corpse.[3]

The purpose of documenting the corpses was to ensure that none had been released by the security services and to inform the families of murdered detainees in due course that the cause of death in each case was either a "*heart attack*" or "*breathing problems*" and to satisfy the authorities that executions had been performed.

Each murdered detainee was given two numbers with only the intelligence service knowing the identities of the corpses.

The procedure for documentation was that when a detainee was killed each body was given a reference number which related to that branch of the security service responsible for his detention and death. When the corpse was taken to the military hospital it was given a further number so as to document, falsely, that death had occurred in the hospital. Once the bodies were photographed they were taken for burial in a rural area.

Because of "Caesar's" deep concern as to what was happening he sent copies of these photographs to a trusted contact using a "flash drive" (memory stick). These photographs also included those who appeared to have been starved to death,

[2] Quotes from "Caesar" are in italics.

[3] "Caesar" explained that the number of photographs taken of each body reduced over time due to an increase in the number of bodies and lack of resources. The forensics team confirmed this by registering an average of four to five images per body.

some with signs of torture prior to death. Indeed, there were marks of beatings and burns even upon those emaciated bodies. In some cases the bodies had no eyes.

The original photographic images taken by "Caesar" or someone in his unit were sent with an official report to the "*military judiciary*".

At the time "Caesar" was planning to defect, he had someone in his section take photographs of a group of bodies to show that the place "*looked like a slaughterhouse*". The excuse he gave for group photographs to his colleagues was that in case they had missed a body they could go back to the group photograph.

"Caesar" told the inquiry team that he did all this "*for the sake of Syria and the Syrian people so that the killers could be prosecuted to achieve justice*".

Fearing for his life and that of his immediate family "Caesar" informed the inquiry team that he escaped from Syria and he described his escape route.

VI. The Evidence of "Caesar's" Contact[4]

The inquiry team also heard evidence from "Caesar's" contact. This witness wrote his name down for the inquiry team. The inquiry team cannot disclose his name in public for reasons of his own security.

The witness confirmed that he was Caesar's relative by marriage and that he had left Syria five days after the civil war against the current Syrian regime had begun and established contact with international human rights groups.

Subsequently an information committee was formed in the Middle East to collect and document material as to what was happening within Syria.

This witness informed the inquiry team that "Caesar" was working with his group from an early stage, the witness having contacted "Caesar" for this purpose in or around September 2011. According to this witness, the regime in Syria was contradicting the authenticity of the information being given out by the group so that "*we started to look for an information source within the regime. There was a problem about gaining evidence about detainees and those who had disappeared. We had to look for people working with the regime itself who are sympathetic to our cause ...*".[5]

The witness informed the inquiry team that when "Caesar" started to be concerned about his safety, after he had sent out tens of thousands of images that this witness and others in his group began to plan for Caesar's successful defection. The witness described how Caesar was exfiltrated from Syria and how his family followed him a while later. The witness dealt with the fact that the defection process took some four months.

VII. Findings of the Inquiry Team

The inquiry team found that the witness codenamed "Caesar" was not only credible but that his account was most compelling.

[4] A member of the Syrian National Movement.

[5] Quotes from the contact are in italics.

"Caesar's" account of the need of the regime in Syria to have photographic images of the persons who were killed is wholly consistent with the need of the regime to ensure that orders for the killing of persons in detention facilities had been carried out. In the view of the inquiry team the need to photograph those who were killed is a strong pointer to the fact that the killings were systematic, ordered, and directed from above.

The evidence of "Caesar", which, for its part, the inquiry team accept, that often up to fifty (50) bodies a day had to be photographed by him or his section, is telling evidence that the killings were systematic. We add to that the fact that the numbering system used to identify the bodies and that was photographed on the bodies was evidence of an organized form of killing.

It was quite clear from the account given by "Caesar" that the emaciation of the bodies of those in detention was something that he regularly encountered when taking the photographs. Indeed the emaciated bodies of those killed may well tell a story of starvation used as a means of torture.

There appear to have been many forms of torture used by those responsible for those in detention. The unmistakable marks of ligature strangulation were evident on a number of bodies. The beatings to which the deceased had been subjected in life were evident on their bodies in death.

The appearance of a large number of young people in the photographic images, with no apparent injuries, is suggestive of death by unnatural means. For example there was evidence of injury by electrocution on some of the bodies. We accept that this is a speculative conclusion. However, looking at this category of images in light of all the other facts, including the fact that those bodies were together with the others who had clearly been murdered, lends support to the conclusion that they met their end at the hands of their captors.

Forensic Findings

Some five thousand five hundred (5,500) images were examined in total by the forensics team. It was apparent that most deceased persons had between four or five images taken of them allowing an estimate of images of one thousand three hundred (1,300) individual corpses being considered by the forensics team.

Initially two thousand (2,000) images were examined as an overview, to provide a sense of the nature and extent of injuries, then a further three thousand five hundred (3,500) were examined in more detail.

The vast majority of the images were of young men most likely between the ages of twenty and forty, with a minority more likely to be up to sixty years old. There were no children. Within the images seen there was only one female body and this was clothed and showed no evidence of injury. The bodies were mostly unclothed or minimally clothed.

Within these five thousand five hundred (5,500) images, images of a total of eight hundred and thirty five (835) deceased persons were evaluated in detail. Of these 2[illegible] showed evidence of inflicted trauma and 30% were equivocal. 42% showed emaciation.

- The ligature marks on the necks were transverse. This would be inconsistent with a typical hanging where the ligature mark rises upon the neck and in the

opinion of the forensics team this represents ligature strangulation. Ligature strangulation of this kind is also consistent with strangulation being used as a method of torture. There were images of deceased person where ligature marks were present on the wrists and ankles. In one case a plastic cable tie was around the ankles, being used as a ligature.

- The majority of the tramline bruises were on the torso, although some were on the limbs. These were highly consistent with repeated impacts with a rod-like object.

- There were other injuries such as bruises and abrasions that were essentially non-specific as no particular causative implement or mechanism could be inferred.

- There was a high level of emaciation and images of many of the individuals showed evidence of discoloration and ulceration primarily in the foot and shin region. The precise aetiology of this is unclear and it could have more than one cause. Potential explanations include pressure effects (pressure sores), vascular insufficiency, inflicted injury such as application of hot or cold objects and tissue breakdown resulting from poor nutritional status.

- It must be noted that as the majority of these ulcerating lesions occurred in young men, a natural explanation for all of these observations is highly unlikely.

Overall there was evidence that a significant number of the deceased were emaciated and a significant minority had been bound and/or beaten with rod-like objects.

In only a minority of the cases examined could a convincing injury that would account for death be seen, but any fatal injury to the back of the body would not be represented in the images. Again, it must be noted the forensics team make clear that there are many ways in which an individual may be killed with minimal, or even absent, external evidence of the mechanism.

Having made the initial overview and the more formal analysis of images of these eight hundred and thirty five (835) bodies a "dip sample" of images of one hundred and fifty (150) separate individuals was included from two randomly selected files for detailed examination. Individuals were included where there was a good view of the body with no significant portion of the body obscured by clothing. Information was recorded based on anatomical regions of the body namely head, neck, torso, upper arm, lower arm, thigh and shin/foot. Within each region, categories of trauma were recorded including scars, ulceration, tramline bruises, non-specific injuries, and ligature marks. It was also recorded when make-shift bandages or apparent ligatures were still present on the body. As a separate category, whether the individuals were emaciated was noted. The results of this are represented in table 1 in the appendix.

Results of the dip sample:

- On the faces of the corpses only non-specific injuries were present.[6] These were seen in 24% of the sample (36 individuals).

[6] For security and privacy purposes faces or other potentially identifying features in images as

- Neck images of 19% of individuals showed non-specific injuries and 16% showed evidence of ligature marks on the neck. In the opinion of the forensics team these ligature marks would be consistent with fatal or non-fatal ligature strangulation. The marks did not appear to be consistent with execution by hanging and in one case a characteristic ligature was in place (figure 5).
- The images of the torso showed scars in 1% of cases, ulceration in 1% of cases and tramline bruising in 5% of cases.
- The majority of injuries seen on images of the arms and forearms were non-specific (10% and 7% respectively) with 1% of cases showing tramline bruising on the arm and 11% showing evidence of ligature marks on the wrists.
- The images of the thighs showed some cases of ulceration (10%) with scars (5%) and tramline bruises (1%).
- The majority of images examined showed ulceration of the shin/foot (55%)[7] with 9% showing scars, and 6% showing non-specific injuries.
- Apparent ligatures were present on the shins of 3% of images and bandages, most of which appeared make-shift, were present in 9%.
- Only 5% of images of bodies showed no apparent evidence of either injury or emaciation.
- 62% of the images of deceased persons showed emaciation.

VIII. Conclusions

- The inquiry team is satisfied that upon the material it has reviewed there is clear evidence, capable of being believed by a tribunal of fact in a court of law, of systematic torture and killing of detained persons by the agents of the Syrian government.
- Such evidence would support findings of **crimes against humanity** against the current Syrian regime.
- Such evidence could also support findings of **war crimes** against the current Syrian regime.

The Rt. Hon. Sir Desmond de Silva QC (Chairman)

Professor David M. Crane

Professor Sir Geoffrey Nice QC

shown in appendix A of this document (which were viewed by the inquiry team in full) have been removed.

[7] See table 2 in appendix B.

IX. Appendices

A. Selected samples of photographs

B. Tables of results of dip sample

C. Glossary of forensic terminology

Appendix A
Selected samples of photographs[8]

Figure 1
Emaciated remains



[8] The images seen by the inquiry team are currently held by the Syrian National Movement.

Figure 2
Emaciated condition of two sets of remains

Note also the degree of ulceration and discolouration of the shin and ankle regions.

Figure 3



Figure 4



Patterned ligature mark on the neck

Figure 5



Belt type object on the neck with a ridged pattern highly consistent with the ligature mark seen in a different individual in figure 4

Figure 6



Emaciated individual with tramline injuries across lower chest wall

Figure 7



Tramline injuries across the anterior chest and abdominal walls

Figure 8



Figure 9

Tramline injuries (marked by arrowheads) across the anterior chest and abdominal walls



Figure 10



Ulceration in the lower shin and foot areas

Appendix B
Tables of results of dip sampl-

Table 1
Summary of injury types recorded from a dip sample of 150 individuals

Region of the body	*Type of injury*	*Number of individuals*	*Percentage of individuals*
Face	Non-specific	36	24
Neck	Non-specific	28	19
	Ligature	24	16
Torso	Non-specific	27	18
	Tramlines	7	5
	Scars	2	1
	Ulceration	1	1
Arm	Non-specific	15	10
	Tramlines	2	1
	Ulceration	1	1
Forearm	Non-specific	11	7
	Ligature	11	7
	Ulceration	4	3
Thigh	Ulceration	15	10
	Non-spe ific	8	5
	Scars	8	5
	Tramlines	2	1
Shin	Ulceration	82	55
	Scars	14	9
	Bandage	14	9
	Non-specific	9	6
	Ligature	5	3
Zero injuries		8	5
Emaciated		93	62

Table 2
Overall incidence of injuries within a region

	Overall incidence of injury type
Face	36
Neck	52
Torso	37
Arm	18
Forearm	26
Thigh	33
Shin	110

Dr. Stuart J. Hamilton, MB, ChB, BMSc (Hons), FRCPath, MFFLM

Professor Susan Black, OBE, BSc, PhD, DSc, FRSE, FRAI, Cert-FA

Appendix C
Glossary of Forensic Terminology

Many forensic terms are used in a specific way by forensic pathologists and anthropologists. For clarity they are identified here.

Bruising: Bruising is produced as the result of leakage of blood from damaged blood vessels. It is most commonly seen with impact (either the body impacting an object or by an object striking a body) or compression such as gripping. Many are relatively non-specific in size and shape although some may reproduce the shape of the object causing the bruise. Examples are ligature marks and footwear marks.

Tramline bruises: These are a specific type of bruise produced by blows with rod-like objects. Such impacts stretch and injure blood vessels at the edges of the object and produce parallel lines of bruising.

Abrasion: Abrasions ("scratches" or "grazes") are the typically the result of shearing forces on the skin removing the outer layers of the skin surface.

Laceration: A laceration is produced by blunt trauma crushing and splitting the skin. In technical terminology sharp objects produce incised wounds, not lacerations.

Gunshot wound: These are a specific form of laceration produced by the passage of a bullet through the body. Entrance wounds are produced when the projectile enters the body. If it also exits the body exit wounds are produced.

Hypostasis: This is also known as lividity or livor mortis. After death blood pools under gravity to the dependent parts of the body, producing a purple-pink discoloration. If the body is moved shortly after this process the blood will shift with the new position, but after a period of time the hypostasis permanently stains the skin (referred to as the hypostasis becoming "fixed").

Decomposition: The process of degradation of the body after death. The two main forms are putrefaction and mummification.

Ulceration: Loss of epithelial (skin) surface. This has many underlying causes.